Is Your Spirituality Violent?

The Emergence of Violence as a Theme in My Theological Life and Work

My recent book, *Consuming Faith,*[1] described corporate branding as a challenge for Christian theology, as well as the problems Christian theology poses for corporate branding. Or so I thought. As I have settled not only into the problems involved in this theological work, but also into my theological life of which this work is a part, I have come to see that there are other dimensions of the problem that attract, implicate, and perplex me. Why I did not see them clearly, I do not yet know. How I began to see them, I can briefly relate. This exercise seems worthy because it remains a very difficult problem where theology actually comes from. The personal reasons for my deepened questioning whether theology can deal with violent power, and not just say, with problems of meaning, interpretation, or validity, can be traced to experiences both social and individual.

As recent studies of the formation of theologians have shown, biographical factors play a significant role in specifying what counts in shaping the attention of the theologian.[2] It is true, however, that I do not often understand what I write or why I write it. I have learned that taking this strangeness of theological writing seriously requires openness for surprise, disturbance, and patient curiosity about what is really at stake for writers and readers in doing theology.

A Social Awakening to Violent Power

A few years ago, several women spoke at Boston College, where I was then teaching. They were from a factory in Honduras, manufacturing clothes for Sean Combs (also known as Puffy, Puff Daddy, P. Diddy, or just Diddy). I knew of his brand, "Sean John," because some of my students wore the clothes. These workers were on a tour of college campuses sponsored by the National Labor Committee, describing working conditions in their factory. They sewed sweatshirts that sold for at least $50 in the USA, and for which they got paid about 25 cents per shirt. They had asked for a tiny raise, and were denied. There were restrictions on bathroom use, no unions allowed, no overtime paid, no days off.

I saw their faces, heard their voices, and felt disgust start to burn inside. Here was, after all, a celebrity who was making excessive amounts of money already. Soon after, I took a train to New York City to join a protest led by the NLC at the new "Sean John" store in Manhattan. A few dozen of us chanting slogans and holding signs for a few hours, in the bright klieg lights, were enough to get Mr. Combs' attention. Within a week, all of these negative conditions were reversed. The list of immediate reforms was stunning, heightening the scandal of their absence beforehand. Quoting from the National Labor Committee report:

> - The most abusive supervisors have been fired-workers are now treated with respect: Chief of production […] and her right-hand assistant have both been fired. Workers report that their treatment in the factory is much improved.
> - Overtime is now voluntary and paid correctly[…]
> - Locks taken off the bathrooms: Workers are no longer required to get a "toilet pass." Guards are no longer posted at the bathroom doors. The bathrooms are clean and supplied with toilet paper.
> - Clean drinking water: Purification filter systems have been installed, and the workers now have clean, safe drinking water to drink.
> - The factory is now kept air-conditioned.

- Social Security health care is on the way: [The factory's] owner has pledged to the workers that he will soon inscribe all the workers in the national Social Security health care system, which provides free health care and medicines for workers and their children.
- The workers believe that the mandatory pregnancy tests will also be terminated.
- […] On December 8 [2003], workers organized and won recognition for their union[.] [3]

This was a stunning example of the authority of one powerful person to ease the conditions of violence imposed on others.

Around this time, I walked into one of the coffee shops in my neighborhood, part of a national chain. I found one of the managers, and offered a proposal: I would travel to the sites, in Latin America or elsewhere, where the coffee sold at this particular shop was harvested. I would interview the coffee farmers, get their stories, take their pictures, interview their families. And I would feature the results of my journalism on the walls of this coffee shop. After all, the only pictures we saw in the coffee shop were romantic scenes of Latin American sunsets over green fields, or romanticized portraits of happy coffee farmers. I offered to pay for this expedition myself (though I was hoping Boston College would help fund it). The manager listened to my story, his surprised face turning eventually to bemused skepticism. There is no way, I was then told, that they would allow such a thing to happen in their store. Too risky, too controversial. But thanks for asking about it, he said, and did I know that they now offered one fair trade coffee on their menu?

Through such experiences, one thing was becoming clear to me: the dangerous power of the face, of the suffering face, the excluded face, the face of a victim. A *story* of suffering may become a morality tale or be coopted by theory. A *face* calls in a different way.

The Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas famously argued that to be human is to be responsible for the suffering of the other, for the person whose well-being our very existence may be threatening. This obligation to others is encountered and symbolized in a unique way in the face-to-face relation. The faces of others present persons genuinely different from us, exposed to us. The vulnerability of the human face presents us with the claim: do not kill me. In a sense, Levinas says, the bare face of another says "do not deface me"; allow me, it says, my otherness without violation, shame, or indifference.[4]

Wherever we are kept from seeing the face of the other, I was slowly seeing, whether of the other who stitches our clothing, or dies from our taxpayer-supported bombs, we make it easier for ourselves to act as if we, too, are not responsible for that other. It is an option only the privileged have available to them.

An Individual Awakening to Violent Power

It is also true that becoming a father has begun a profound resituating of my orientation to my work. The birth of our daughter initiated an ongoing state of deep surprise in me about my sudden and extravagant love for her, and an utterly new desire—that she flourish in a nonviolent world. This apocalypse has conducted me into such a radical reconsideration of priorities, of the radical power of natality, of presence to unmerited love to heal, that I have begun to think more seriously about the apocalypses, the interruptions, that make us who we are, that refashion in depth our orientation to the everyday. I have had many such interruptions in my life, and many of them were quite far from the overspill of everyday joy given in my daughter to me.

One of those apocalypses occurred when I was 23 years old, the summer before I started my two-year high school teaching career. I was sitting in my apartment with my girlfriend late at night. Outside, I heard my roommate and his girlfriend arriving in his car, and I got up to open the

door. I saw them through the window walking up to the door, arms full of presents and other things from a party. I opened the front door, and as they stepped up to it, several men, four or five, suddenly rushed out from behind some bushes and drew guns, forcing all of us back inside. Most of the men ran through the apartment, cutting phone lines, stealing money, keys, and other things, including a guitar I had borrowed from my next door neighbor. One of the men, waving a metallic blue gun at us, commanded the four of us face down on the floor. He tore the necklaces and bracelets off the two women, yelling to keep our faces buried in the floor. He stood behind us, and when my roommate stupidly started to mouth off, I turned my head slightly and saw the gun right behind his head and mine. Time slowed down interminably. I thought how stupid it was to die when I was so young. I knew that there had been a gang responsible for dozens of robberies and many rapes in our part of Kansas City that summer, and I wondered if these were the men. The overintensity of the situation prevented me from being able to anticipate, or even force myself to wonder, at what it would be like to be shot in the head, or for my girlfriend or friends to be shot or raped next to me. Each second was full enough of a strangely peaceful terror, and I was also conscious of thinking of important people and experiences in my life. Then suddenly, the men were running out the door, and the leader said to us, "If I see your face through the window, I will put a bullet through your skull." He ran out, and we were motionless for five minutes. Then there was quiet crying. Slowly I was aware of a paralyzing and astonishingly helpless sense of violation whose residue has never fully left me. At least one of the men was later arrested, and the police told us it was indeed the same gang responsible for the other acts of violence. The experience disabused me of any naïve trust in humanity remaining from my childhood, haunting me in almost every late-night noise, unlocked door, violent movie scene, and aggressive male posturing I encounter.

Remembering this apocalypse does not qualify me to understand all other forms of violence, as if from above or deep within. I see these autobiographical episodes as clues to the ways that life's disorientations can begin to add up to a new personal theological outlook. The memories spur a continued destabilizing of my theology, making me wonder what awful human capacity I have encountered, and how theology might help encounter, think through, and even, perhaps, help to heal it.

Coupling this interruption with the even deeper disorientation my daughter has brought, these traumas undergone with God, have converged with the thinking of my last book and the experiences of activism it occasioned. These experiences helped me to see that there was a deep ethical point in my last book of which I was unaware: the problem of relations of violence in which we are involved. How are we involved, I want to know, in the traumas of others? And as a theologian, I want to know whether and how our spiritual commitments involve us in violence. And so I have gone back to the question of branding that I raised in *Consuming Faith* from this perspective of a theological concern for violence. Wasn't what I was concerned with in that book the violent effects of branding on those employed by the branding companies?

This chapter will eventually turn toward a more serious consideration of Catholic higher education as trending toward violent practice. Although, and because, few people think of Catholic higher education as a system participating in violence, a comprehension of the violence allowed by Catholic higher education must first take place within a composition of the place of American spirituality. This means having a felt sense not for spirituality as theorized in the official discourses of church theology or state religious studies, but for spirituality as practiced, a process of analysis I would define as *what we can learn of American spirituality not from what it professes, but from the kinds of things that it fails to contest*. Such a project, in its fullness, would extend far beyond one essay, but I would like to dwell briefly on the public emergence of torture as an "acceptable" American practice in recent years, as part of the "war on terror." Let me be clear that in allowing ourselves a patient awareness of torture's reality, Christians undergo a necessary training for awareness of even subtler forms of violence in our midst enabled by our

spirituality. This is the pedagogical and political link I presume between our torturing society and our dangerous slide into an ever more capitalistic system of Catholic higher education in the United States. No one would suggest that torture is the same violence as socialization into consumer capitalist higher education, but I propose that both evidence something of American spirituality's weakness in face of contemporary social power, whether economic, military, or educational. From the stance of such an awareness, it becomes more possible to see Catholic higher education, especially in its more elite and striving forms—forms that set the pace for all the non-elite Catholic colleges and universities—as a way violence is held and governed by Catholic spirituality. An unsavory outcome, to be sure, but no practical theology can take as its starting point the avoidance of unhappy deflations of what were held as articles of faith.

Michel Foucault helped give language for a relation between branding and violence, a construal of branding as a violent power. This was, as I have said, a relation I had already begun to make in *Consuming Faith* but which I did not yet see clearly enough in its starkness, which means I also did not take seriously enough theology's stake in an intervention against branding as violence, which means I did not see clearly enough what a theology of nonviolence in a branded world might look like. I did not see clearly enough that spirituality can support violence when it is indifferent to the violent power of branding.

Branding as a Violent Power: Foucault

Foucault was not even really talking about "branding" in the sense in which we typically mean it in postmodern capitalism. Yet he analyzes an important thread of the history of Western culture that helped produce the power relations that govern corporate branding. This thread has to do with the institutional affixing of identities to individuals – what can be rendered in English as "branding"—on both a larger scale and a more fundamental level. Specifically, it has to do with the way in which prisons fixed and enforced the culturally marginal and dangerous identity of the criminal, the offender, the delinquent, the recidivist. The complex of penal institutions, "after purging the convicts by means of their sentence, continues to follow them by a whole series of 'brandings' (*marquages*)," such as continued surveillance and the permanence of police records, "and which thus pursues as a 'delinquent' someone who has acquitted himself of his punishment as an offender."[5]

By rendering a person outcaste, dangerous, or abnormal, by rendering him or her permanently fixed not only to their past but to an identity embedded in the social adjudicator of "security," branding is a sort of proto-violence. It is a condition for discrimination, enchainment to a harmful network of relationships. Branding and social exclusion are bound up in the same power of modern forms of social control.[6] This is not the kind of exclusion that keeps some people purely segregated from the rest of society. Foucault seems to use the term "branding" to talk about fixing an identity, through the capacity for ongoing social control of the non-normal, in a way that is useful for those who benefit from the docility and usefulness of branded peoples. After naming modern delinquency as a sort of "visible, branded [*marquée*] existence," Foucault suggests that "delinquency, controlled illegality, is an agent for the illegality of the dominant groups."[7] In other words, Foucault suggests that branding is a practice of social control under modern forms of penal power. Dominant groups benefit when people become branded as useful delinquents. Foucault gives the examples of prostitution, arms and drug trafficking, and illegal alcohol sales.[8]

There are thus, he implies, the branded and the unbranded, the marked and the unmarked. This is a distinction familiar to queer theory, which has shown how "normal" identities go unmarked in society (and religion), and abnormal, unnatural, hybrid, or otherwise troubling ("queer") identities are (re)marked (upon), noticed, tracked, in a word, branded. And by branding the abnormal or socially marginal who remain useful for dominant groups, power is given a foothold by which to attempt to manage social relationships.[9]

This brief encounter with Foucault helpfully complicates how I and others have set up a theological analysis of branding in particular and our economy in general. First, it places branding within contemporary power relationships, and thus within social relations of force and, potentially, relations of violence. Second, it problematizes who is branded in our society, suggesting that branding has a political, managerial function of maintaining certain ways of life for some at the expense of the health, social status and ultimately, flourishing, of others.

It also proposes several specific problems for theological analysis: How do we learn to desire to be branded by corporations? What forms of violence are we part of when we consent to branding practices? Even if we take pride in not being mastered by the corporations whose brands we individually (through purchases) and socially (through laws) support, do we allow our relation to ourselves and God to be interrupted by the way in which our branding practices brand others? For in a globalized economy, it is never only about us. Every economic decision is a potential branding in Foucault's sense: the maintenance of a politically docile marginal identity which privilege finds useful.

The deep formation in violent branding practices goes hand in hand with the imperial psychology our culture has allowed.[10] But it bears pausing on the question of "spirituality" and its state in American life in order to appreciate more fully how the privileges of empire, or at least imperial psychology, structure our lives today.

Contemporary Spirituality and Violent Power

Many theologians and religious thinkers show us that violence is the negative index of human transcendence, the strange and mysterious power we have to construct, tolerate, enforce, and even then have the privilege of forgetting about the denial of the strange mystery proper to created being.[11] A power paradoxically radical and banal, violence is the forced denial of the freedom of creation to flourish. Violence is not power as such, but the effect of pleasure in dominative power over others. As so many adults who have frankly reviewed their own upbringing have realized, and as many historians and philosophers who have surveyed the United States' own history have shown, violence need not register as conscious to be effective, need not be intentional to be real. The psychological violence to which many children are subject, the institutional racism that has been the shadowy spouse of American history, the fear of the religious other that has almost constitutionally been the product and nemesis of Catholic history, these are all different "forms" of violence, yet all reminders that violence can operate at a social depth extraordinarily resistant to both tolerant politeness and critical thinking. Joyce Schuld has shown something like this when she argues that Foucault and Augustine converge in their understanding that there are profound constrictions on us that circulate through us, with and without our conscious permission, showing us how corrupted relationships permeate our social-historical and everyday existence.[12] Grace Jantzen shows, even more radically, how violence itself may well be foundational to the western intellectual tradition, insofar as philosophy has constructed itself with a remarkable thoroughness on fantasized control of women's bodies.[13] Whatever else these theological and religious researches show, they demand our attention to our own implication in the circulation of violent practices, regardless of our goodwill and enlightened intentions.

Does spirituality, as typically understood today, license such violence? Indeed, it seems difficult today to see "spirituality" as even remotely related to violence.

One of the most common ways for Americans to describe themselves today is as "spiritual" persons (as distinct from "religious"). Someone's "spirituality" may be their way of talking about faith in a deity, in nature, in a particular value, or in themselves.

The fact of diverse spiritualities today testifies to the seriousness (sometimes through irreverence) with which people take their quests to discover the significance of their lives, to honor and interpret their deepest passions. Our contemporary passion for spirituality wants to distinguish itself from religion. This seems evident when spirituality is defined as experiential (as opposed to juridical), interior (versus external or doctrinal), individual (as opposed to institutional), freeing and trustworthy (neither restrictive nor suspect), pure (not sinful), and a connector between religions (as opposed to a wall between them). Today's understanding of spirituality enables people of various religious traditions—and none at all—to respect each other's "journey" of faith. It gives a common faith language to the recovering addict and the gym junkie, the gang member and the politician, the passionate faith practitioner and the indifferent secularist.

Notably absent from popular understandings of spirituality are questions about responsibility for power, much less license for violence. The very question "Is your spirituality violent?" seems to be seldom if ever asked in contemporary America. An internet search for the phrase "violent spirituality" turned up only 6 different examples of the phrase itself. And while it is easy to think of thousands of everyday questions that return millions of "hits" on searches, I found that the specific question "is your spirituality violent?" returned zero.[14]

Jeremy Carrette and Richard King, in their recent book *Selling Spirituality*, provide an analysis that may help to explain the strange silence of spirituality in regard to violent relationships.[15] Carrette and King survey the rise of the discourse on spirituality in Europe and North America, and look at the way in which Christianity and the so-called "Eastern religions" get repackaged in the current interest in spirituality. Religious traditions whose spiritual practices are bound up historically with social responsibility, with cultural criticism, and even radical political activism, find their practices detached, depoliticized, and made nonthreatening for Western spiritual practitioners. Meditation, yoga, dietary habits, prayers, and other spiritual exercises lose their social "dangerousness" when they become dropped into the shopping cart of our over-individualized, over-psychologized sense of spiritual entitlement. Theirs is a challenging diatribe in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, putting before people of conscience what is at stake in the appeal to spirituality in Western everyday life.

Insofar as they are right, we can see how spirituality might want to forget its relationship to violence. Once spirituality as a form of experience does not understand itself as caught up in, and in some measure responsible for, relations of power, and therefore of violence, we are all in a more deeply dangerous situation, especially the vulnerable among us and around the globe who do not have the luxury of a nonpolitical, noneconomic spirituality. In the light of Carrette and King's work, I now see that the route I have been trying to map is a geography of the spiritual license to abusive practices. Let Christians not think that members of other faiths are the only ones capable of faith-based violence. Our country may still be, in a very qualified sense, a "Christian nation," but one whose construction of spirituality allows victims, and of them, far too many.[16] It is hard to ignore the interrelation of the major movements of our culture, the twin passions for both consumption and spirituality. Might these dual appetites be comprehended by a third term?

Imperial Psychology: Outsourcing and Torture

I propose to irradiate their connections by the way these twin passions serve an imperial psychology. This imperial psychology, a state of soul, keeps the form of experience that we call spirituality from letting through deep questions about and personal responsibility for the suffering caused by our cultural practices, such as economic or military practices—what we buy, and who and how we fight. Thus our spirituality is kept from experiencing the outrage that would lead to greater and more varied resistance to violence by Christians and other people of conscience.

Imperial psychology configures a spirituality that imagines that one is not finally dependent on others.

Imperial psychology assumes that the suffering of Americans is of greater spiritual significance than that of anyone else. It has the privilege of choosing to not care about people who might teach us about ourselves, who might interrupt the security of our American and Christian identity. Thus, imperial psychology lacks interest in Iraqi body counts, European attitudes toward the United States, or in seeing itself as one member—among others—of a global community. This state of soul thinks that American security and freedom are the highest forms possible to anyone—especially because we have worked so hard for them. From this position, no quarter can be given to any possible ambiguity in our own motives or any vulnerability that we might share with those who threaten our "way of life."

This imperial psychology that lets on to a violent spirituality is horrifically evident even in our own day in the way the USA has permitted and practiced torture. Investigations continue into the disturbing practice of "extraordinary rendition", the secret transport of people arrested by the United States to be interrogated in countries with questionable human rights records. Questions also remain about secret American prisons in foreign countries. But is it not too easy to allow such practices to be branded themselves as part of the "war on terrorism"? If we are not to allow the brand its defacing power, we should listen to some experiences of the tortured.

As has been reported in the American press, Maher Arar, who was born in Syria and is a Canadian citizen, was apprehended by US authorities in New York City at Kennedy International Airport, on 26 September 2002. Here is how Bob Herbert in the *New York Times* describes part of the story. At the airport, Arar

> was locked in chains and shackles and accused of being 'a member of a known terrorist organization.' There was no evidence to support the accusation, and no evidence has ever come to light. Nevertheless […], Mr. Arar was shipped off to Syria, where he was kept in an underground rat-infested, grave-like cell, and tortured. (When I visited him in Ottawa last year, he told me how he had screamed and wept and begged both God and his captors for mercy.) After 10 months, he was released. No charges against him were ever filed…
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> The reality, he said, is that his life has been all but completely destroyed. He is fearful. He has become psychologically and emotionally distant from his wife and two young children. He has nightmares. He can't find a job. He spins dizzily from one bout with depression to another. And some former friends who are Muslim will no longer associate wit him because 'they're afraid to be the next target.'
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> 'I mean, you can tell, no one wants to hear about me,' he said. 'After 9/11, everyone branded with the terrorism label—they're doomed.'[17]

There is also the account of Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen who was picked up while vacationing in Macedonia and taken to Afghanistan to be abused and intimidated at a secret CIA prison. No evidence was found for abducting him, much less torturing and holding him from 31 December 2003 through 28 May 2004. According to his testimony, he was kept for 23 days in a hotel in Macedonia in isolation, threatened with guns, and interrogated; he then went on a hunger strike in protest. His testimony continues:

> On January 23, 2004, I was handcuffed, blindfolded, and placed in a car. The car eventually stopped and I heard airplanes. I was taken from the car and led to a building where I was severely beaten. Someone sliced the clothes off my body, and when I would

> not remove my underwear, I was beaten again until someone forcibly removed it from me. I was thrown on the floor, my hands were pulled behind me, and someone's boot was placed on my back. Then I felt something firm being forced inside my anus.
>
> I was dragged across the floor and my blindfold was removed. I saw seven or eight men dressed in black and wearing black ski masks. One of the men placed me in a diaper and a tracksuit. I was put in a belt with chains that attached to my wrists and ankles, earmuffs were placed over my ears, eye pads over my eyes, and then I was blindfolded and hooded. After being marched to a plane, I was thrown to the floor facedown, and my legs and arms were spread-eagled and secured to the sides of the plane. I felt two injections, and I was rendered nearly unconscious. At some point, I felt the plane land and take off again. When it landed again, I was unchained and taken off the plane. It felt very warm outside, and so I knew I had not been returned to Germany. I later learned that I was in Afghanistan.
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> Once off the plane, I was shoved into the back of a vehicle. After a short drive, I was dragged out of the car, pushed roughly into a building, and left in a small, dirty, cold concrete cell. That first night I was interrogated by six or eight men dressed in the same black clothing and ski masks, as well as a masked American doctor and a translator. They stripped me of my clothes, photographed me, and took blood and urine samples. I was returned to my cell, where I would remain in solitary confinement, with no reading or writing materials, and without once being permitted outside to breathe fresh air, for more than four months.
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> During this time, I was interrogated three or four times, always by the same man, with others who were dressed in black clothing and ski masks, and always at night. The man who interrogated me asked about whether I had taken a trip to Jalalabad using a false passport; whether I had attended Palestinian training camps; and whether I knew the September 11 conspirators or other alleged extremists. As in Macedonia, I truthfully denied his accusations. Two men who participated in my interrogations identified themselves as Americans. My requests to meet with a representative of the German government or a lawyer, or to be brought before a court, were repeatedly ignored.[18]

Can there be any surprise in learning that it took five years for a declassified report to show that Arar was never any threat to American security?[19] We must listen also to the testimony of those who, in "our" name, took part in carrying out torture, such as Anthony Lagouranis, an Army interrogator in Iraq in 2004-2005.

> When the chief warrant officer at our interrogation site in Mosul first told me to use dogs during interrogations, it seemed well within what was allowed by our written rules and consistent with what was being done at Abu Ghraib and other detention centers. The dogs were muzzled and held by a handler. The prisoners didn't know that, though, because they were blindfolded; if they gave me an answer I didn't like, I could cue the handler so the dog would bark and lunge toward them. Sometimes they were so terrified they'd wet their jumpsuits. About halfway through my tour, I stopped using dogs and other 'enhancements' like hypothermia that qualify as torture even under the most nonchalant readings of international law. I couldn't handle being so routinely brutal.[20]

There is a damning metaphor for the US practice of torture that unintentionally links it to the way American companies are allowed to conduct themselves: "outsourcing." To "outsource" in business is to contract out part of the work that goes into a product, usually for purpose of saving

costs. Almost all abuses of human dignity in the manufacture of clothing by American companies abroad are linked to "outsourcing" as an economic rationale. Similarly, to "outsource" in regard to "homeland security" is to send suspects abroad to be squeezed for information in ways that would be unconscionable were they to (publicly be known to) take place on American soil. The use of the term "outsource" to describe both practices provides an unsettlingly illuminative connection between branding and torture: to outsource is to attempt to hide the face—the face of those at the receiving end of the power to outsource. Punishing those who are unfortunate enough to fall beneath our boots, or should I say to fall beneath that recent middle class youth fashion, our moon boots? Or our tennis shoes, sandals, or jeans, most all outsourced to those who must work under conditions about which the best we can feebly say is, "Well, at least they have jobs and aren't really working in sweatshops?"

Outsourcing, torture, invisible foreign labor: A hellish circle among whose enabling powers is the license provided by the hand-washing "spirituality" of American faith. It is indeed an "extraordinary rendition" of the tune we like to hear played, that we are Christians, that America is a majority Christian nation, one with "values." Can we any longer be surprised that our spiritually hungry society is at the same time a "torturing society"[21]?

For myself, American Christianity's shadow role in this awful tale could be glimpsed in one vignette from the halls of Abu Ghraib.

In 2004-2005, our country learned that under U.S. Army Specialist Charles Graner, detainees were subject to a regimen of physical and psychological abuse and torture, including forced masturbation, being made to lie naked in a pile with other prisoners while their captors jumped on and beat them, suffering strikes from a metal baton to a detainee's wounded leg, being handcuffed to a door for eight hours, sleeping naked in cold and wet cells, being urinated on by soldiers, having to eat from a toilet, enduring threats of sexual violence against them and their wives, and being forced to eat pork and disavow Islam.

Strikingly, this physical and psychological damage was then put into a spiritual frame. According to detainee Ameen Said Al-Sheikh, "Graner told me to thank Jesus for keeping me alive." With that statement, the torture suddenly entered the theological realm, casting the abuse as part of a Christian sensibility.[22]

Without overfocusing on Specialist Graner, we can say that it is entirely *plausible* that an American could make such a statement. The statement and its context accurately sum up the way many American Christians feel about the treatment of detainees. This statement, however, is a direct challenge to American spirituality. Why? Because Americans pride themselves on a faith that is essentially private. Indeed, when we use the term "spirituality" rather than "religion," as I have suggested, we are usually describing faith as an individual experience, as something separate from obligation to a tradition or community, something more pure and freeing than the walls of an embarrassingly particular, and probably broken, "religion." Yet a private spirituality cannot provide any help in thinking about why this alleged theological claim is wrong. To do so, it must become public, it must risk proposing an alternative vision of Christianity, and it must engage in reasoned argument about faith. To keep spirituality private, in the face of this concrete abuse of persons in the name of Christianity, is tantamount to endorsing the alleged torture. If you can claim that your Jesus is private, Graner can claim that his is, as well, and the prisoners are the ones who pay the price for our private spiritual pleasures.

Yet every Christian, and person of conscience, who is repulsed at this use of "thanking Jesus" shows by their very outrage that spirituality, and attendant theological claims, are necessarily public. The alleged abuse is a *public* enactment of a theological claim (that Jesus accepts violence toward these detainees). The resistance to that theological claim drags spirituality out of its private captivity and into the publicness of righteous anger, an anger that can and must have good *public* reasons to denounce that image of Jesus.

Where is the modern Confessing Church to question how our contemporary spirituality licenses violence? Is there not a need for a postmodern equivalent of the illegal seminary founded by Bonhoeffer and his students, sites of formation for prayer and action on the part of theologians and students of theology? Have we even begun to comprehend the irrelevance of Catholic theology to questions of violence, power, and spirituality in our larger society? Where are the theologians who admit a tension and division within themselves between their hope of leading a theological life, and their circumscription by theology as a "career", by the difference between theology as a way of life and theology as a professional professoriate? One need not romanticize the days of the public "theological giants" like Tillich, Murray and Niebuhr to ask such questions, nor be ungrateful for the achievements of an entire generation of American Catholic theologians in making theology a respectable and critical discipline—in the academy. Where are the theologians willing to not allow their scholarship to be swallowed into narrowly academic publishing, too often a guarantee of political neutrality and cultural irrelevance? What is the form of theological work today that will be most responsible to both the intellectual and political, not to mention mystical and ecclesial, responsibilities of the theologian? And in the Catholic Church in the United States, specifically, where is the resistance to the appeal to spirituality to control or ignore the other?

[V] Violence on the American Catholic Landscape

It is not, then, as if Catholic practices take place in a cultural vacuum. They must be located today in the violent relation to self and others into which we are initiated in our society. Do we see violence in need of theological attention on the Catholic landscape today? I propose an arena of Catholic life for consideration: higher education. Specifically, the violence now inherent in the tuition-debt structure of a good (and influential and well-respected) portion of Catholic higher education.

In his recent book *Lessons of the Masters*, George Steiner asks, "How is it possible to *pay* for the transmission of wisdom, of knowledge, of ethical doctrine or logical insights? What monetary equivalence or rate of exchange can be calculated as between human sagacity and the bestowal of truth on the one hand, and an honorarium in cash on the other?"[23] Most of the 28 Jesuit colleges and universities in the United States, such as the one in which I teach, have decided: well over $40,000 a year. This figure includes tuition, room and board, insurance, and school supplies. It is becoming routine for Catholic colleges and universities in the United States to top $25,000-$30,000 a year when all expenses are calculated. Indeed, many of the top Catholic college and universities are perhaps less than a decade away from announcing that a 4-year degree will cost $200,000.

If you have not been in college for a while or do not have relatives in school, the numbers may shock you. As of 2006, at least half a dozen Jesuit colleges and universities charge more than $30,000 for tuition and fees. Santa Clara University, where I teach, currently sets tuition at almost $31,000. The average tuition rate for all Jesuit colleges and universities is well over $25,000 a year.[24] According to a College Board report, 4-year private college and university tuition and fees alone in the USA averages $22,218.[25] Remember that to these tuitions must usually be added approximately $10,000 a year for room, board, books and other necessary supplies and expenses, and it is easy to see how $40,000 is quickly becoming the new normal cost for a year in a good quality private college.

Can it be any accident that the extraordinary tuition rates being charged at Catholic universities are correlated to an increased attention to the branding of Catholic higher education? We more or less freely now talk about the uniqueness of the Catholic brand, the Benedictine brand, even Notre Dame itself as a brand, as easily as we imagine and treat Harvard or Yale as

brands. Anxiety about how much ground has already been lost to the corporate takeover of Catholic education has led to many conversations inside Catholic institutions, and the beginning of public explorations of the issues. For examples, an entire issue of a Jesuit publication was devoted to debating whether branding was appropriate for Jesuit education—and the side in favor featured voices that represent strong, established and influential constituencies in Catholic higher education—not least among them, the business schools.[26] People are actually paid to be concerned with the university's "logo", and to manage Catholic higher education branding for parents, students, and the media. In the last few years in at least one prominent Catholic university, faculty were sent a new sticker with the university "logo", which was, they were informed, recently "refreshed" (the language of university symbolics now being borrowed from the ephemeral world of the web). Faculty were asked to display the new logo publicly, and therefore help in the branding of the university.[27]

Those who defend the use of branding most often say that Catholic education has the right to use what the larger society uses, and put it to better uses. In this reading, "branding" is essentially politically and theologically neutral, and depending on the intentions of the institution, can be used for either good or ill. But as both Foucault and the experience of contemporary capitalism shows, branding is a form of social control built on exploitation, trafficking in violence. It encourages not an economy of grace, but of force: whether the psychological coercion of advertising or the physical coercion of the sweatshop. This does not mean that our religious institutions do not try to brand us in particular ways. But insofar as those practices share in the forms of power that structure corporate branding, they are at least proto-violent. And no incipiently violent form of relationship should be undertaken by Christians without quite serious pause.

Few would dispute that students receive an excellent education at Catholic colleges and universities. Fewer still would argue that services, supplies or salaries should be cut in order to bring down costs. (I am well aware that paying the expanding ranks of lay faculty like me help fuel the tuition increases.) And no student is ungrateful for the many grants that help take a bite out of these costs. Such grants, however, often fall far short of what most students need to be free of negative financial pressures on their educational and vocational decisions in college. The crucial point is that, now that the cost of Catholic higher education is essentially indistinguishable from that of other private upper-tier schools (Santa Clara, for example, costs almost as much as Stanford; Boston College almost as much as Harvard), it is worth asking whether Catholic colleges and universities should make themselves distinctive in the landscape of higher education, not only by how and what they teach, but by how they deal with tuition.

While the high cost of Catholic education purchases a certain cultural "distinction" in a society where economically elite institutions are associated with excellence, influence and power, the prospect of a $200,000 education moves Catholic education into a dangerous zone of handmaid to the structural violences apparent in American capitalism in an "age of growing inequality" fostered by the current American class structure, raising the question of becoming an inordinate burden on the middle and lower classes, not to mention introducing an array of problems that are counter to its own best hopes.

Many of my students at Santa Clara from disadvantaged backgrounds, for example, forgo the social and intellectual benefits of campus "cocurricular" activities like social, political, or academic clubs, or artistic performances, because they must work to pay their own way. Many others, willing or not, go into substantial debt from age 18 to 22 in order to get the education they want, a loan debt that for each college graduate now averages around $20,000, according to Anya Kamenetz's research.[28] The anticipation of that debt very quickly and deeply restricts students' freedom to follow God's call of vocation. Anticipating years of loan repayments, they are lashed to "bottom line" life decisions for decades. Let us not miss the fact that Catholic schools outsource the loan arrangements to non-Catholic loan agencies who have never been bothered by

the historic theological debates about usury, nor the contemporary concern for Catholic education as discernment for God-given vocation.

For students whose parents can afford to pay several thousand dollars a month, the money frequently becomes a constricting force on educational decisions. Parents who are forking over so much cash may and do pressure students in overt and covert ways to buy a "redeemable" degree. Neil Howe and William Strauss, in an influential study of this generation and their parents, describe some zealous Baby Boomer parents who overmanage students' educational decisions, from choice of major to selection of courses. These are the "helicopter" parents, hovering above students' daily life, in regular contact through cell phone and email, securing their entrée in students' lives by the power to write tuition checks.[29]

Deficits of in-house research tell the story in negative: Just as Catholic schools are not known for careful internal research about how staff and faculty manage to pay their bills, nor for what the tenure process actually does to the lives and goals of young faculty, studies of students whose lives are managed by the money issues are virtually nonexistent. I mean students at these schools who work full time; who drain their parents' savings or put parents in lifelong debt; students who carry such debt themselves for what should otherwise be their most energetic, creative, and barnstorming years of their 20s-40s; who change majors under pressure from parents or imagined future employers; who graduate early to avoid paying more tuition, thereby missing irreplaceable rituals and relationships in the last year of college; who drop out of Catholic institutions for financial reasons, or, most damningly, who take on the capitalist logic of the system by redefining their own desires from the first year of college, or maybe even before they set foot on campus, because they know that they need to play the system so as to get a degree that will cash out for them later, that will have made the $100,000 to $150,000 or more "worth it". If I mention in class that at one point in my life I lived in public housing and was on the government's free lunch program, I inevitably get students following up by discreet email asking me for advice about how they will survive their Catholic education financially. Some are surprised that we might even say a few words about the students or professors' social class in the classroom; it brings the realities far too tightly in focus—for the privileged, the underclass, and those in the dicey and anxious middle. Such are the informal sets of data too many of us already have, and even more than that: we have a felt sense for the ways in which a promising student's deep needs were not met—and could have been, were it not for anything more than a lack of courage and creativity on the part of each of us responsible for this mission. And there is no institutional way of remembering these students, of openly discussing, much less memorializing, these failures of mission.

When middle class parents must scrape bottom to send one child to school; when parents with several children experience despair in face of the hundreds of thousands of dollars a Catholic education would cost, and must choose which children will go to their first-choice schools and which will settle for the hometown college, or less; when the pressures of making a college major "worth the cost" make wealthy and wealth-aspiring students narrow their future goals to medical school, law school, or "free market" business school training; when students routinely calculate how much each course, class, or minute of instruction is costing them; when, in other words, those who undergo a Catholic education become unduly positioned by capitalist ways of proceeding, then Catholic schools are in deep danger of becoming merely a waystation for America's stratified life, a socioeconomic violence both structural and personal, with little hope of effectively naming and understanding this violence, much less interrupting it.

Perhaps, then, the deepest and most dangerous cost of tuition elitism in Catholic education is the twin damage to American society and Catholic educational ideals. By rising up to name-brand prices, Catholic schools unwittingly help perpetuate the economic violence of the operative class system in American higher education.

No doubt people will ask: Is it not too extreme to call this a violent system? I would only ask you to place yourself in imagination over the life span of students so effected, and to imagine what else could become of their lives were such debts not so foundational for so many. I would ask you, especially if you graduated from college some time ago, or if you yourself came from a privileged family, and even though it feels so unsporting and even disloyal to do so, to consider the violences of this system: to remember that we are talking about four years of a young adult life when desires are shaped, values are incorporated, debts (psychological and financial) are incurred, when an entire orientation to a set of adult possibilities, indeed to a vocation, becomes available, to varying degrees, in a way never possible in the same way again in life. I call the demolition of dreams, the subtle inculturation into forgetfulness of one's deep desires, the indoctrination into a scale of values that sidetrack the most creative, courageous, hopeful, and distinctive elements of a college student's personality and potential—I call all this violence, at once psychological, spiritual, and financial—directed at an age group we would rather control than set free. You can start a second or third career at age 30, 40, or 50, but you can never again pay such reckless attention to your desires, in the context of needing to please neither parents nor employers, as you can at age 22. No one gets a second chance at that opportunity to feel what it might mean to try oneself on for size.

And because I teach in a Jesuit university, let me note that in the case of Jesuit higher education in particular, this damage to American society is also a threat to the unique identity of Jesuit education. While education priced for the aristocracy is a mark of distinction in our society, it is not the sort of mark that makes a school more faithful to the Ignatian charism. After all, a Jesuit college or university's way of "doing business" models powerfully what it really means, in the formulation of Superior General Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, to educate the whole person for solidarity with the world.[30]

Have Jesuit colleges and universities forgotten the original free-tuition vision of Jesuit education? As a way of living a vow to poverty, of affirming the God-given potential in students of all social classes, and thus of making concrete a belief in God's freely-bestowed gift of grace, Jesuit schools early on strove to work entirely from endowments. As John O'Malley has written, from their "religious motives," early Jesuits started "the first systematic and widespread effort to provide free education for large numbers of students in a given town or city."[31] The spirituality of the Society helped ensure that a Jesuit education should in principle, and in practice, be open to anyone. The advent of the $200,000 Catholic education ought to shake us to a reconsideration of that initial vision of free tuition and Fr. Kolvenbach's contemporary challenge to students.

Free Tuition in Catholic Higher Education

My proposal in this regard is simple: It is time for Catholic higher education to free itself of the burdens of playing according to the rules of American socioeconomic stratification; it is time for Catholic colleges and universities to reclaim the uniqueness of Catholic commitments to justice and dignity; it is time, too, for a shared Catholic penance for another violence I have not discussed here, Catholic sexual abuse of children and teenagers.[32] It is time for a definitive commitment to reparations in the form of a blanket graciousness to all young people who desire to study in Catholic colleges and universities.

In short, I propose that it is time for Catholic colleges and universities to become 100% tuition-free. Free tuition for all students at Catholic colleges and universities could be a guiding image of our day for Catholic education, a symbol of the vibrancy and daring fidelity to forming the whole person for intellectual excellence and faith that does justice. This commitment should make of Catholic schooling a call to radical hope, a socioeconomic sign of peace.

Can we afford it? There are indications that money is out there for projects that call Catholic education into a new and hopeful vision. Whether one looks to Voice of the Faithful or many of the other Catholic community organizations that have gained steam in recent decades,

there are donors to be tapped. And Catholic charitable organizations, or organizations that have given to Catholic educational institutions, might well be interested in being associated with the ground floor of such an endeavor. Moreover, recent political history has shown that hundreds of thousands of Americans can and will donate very large sums of money if they are moved by inspiring ideas and shown the urgency of the cause—and if it is easy for them to donate. And there are many employees in Catholic institutions, including myself, who would happily go out and "beg alms" in support of such a vision.

But this is not just a newer iteration of an old-fashioned fundraising strategy. I am willing to beg alms because I share in the sinfulness of my church and so should share in its penance. But so too should the bishops, who should be on the front lines begging alms.

Allow the vision for even a moment: bishops next to professors next to students and staff, next to people of good will all making a global appeal for free tuition in American Catholic colleges and universities, as both penance and promise of God's reign.

Of course, the money would not come all at once, but success could breed success. By staggering the goals, potential donors could easily observe the progress of the free tuition initiative. So, for example, a Catholic college or university might aim to reduce tuition by 10% in 5 years, by 25% in 10 years, by 50% in 20 years, and eventually by 100%. As at each stage the goal is met, donors would see that the goal is realistic and the project serious. A website that would communicate the progress of the initiative to the world, and allow people of good will to send in donations toward the final goal, would keep potential and actual students, their parents, and the rest of the world informed about progress.

There would also be some secondary benefits of free tuition. Applications to a good school with a free tuition initiative would undoubtedly increase, perhaps even skyrocket. This would elevate admissions competition, allowing Catholic schools to be even more selective about their student body while retaining a commitment to invite students from disadvantaged backgrounds.

The increased applications and decreased admission rate would affect the school's rankings positively. The school would become more elite in status—but for the right reasons. And the challenge of going to 100% free tuition would garner constant media attention. Meeting the goals every few years would occasion worldwide coverage, and undoubtedly pressure other Catholic places of higher education to explain why they themselves could not do this. The secular media might, surprisingly, be the best evangelizers for education as a socioeconomic sign of peace.

Committing to free tuition may seem absurd because unrealistic. Where would the money come from? How could this ever possibly work?

Understandable as they are, such questions are conditioned by a modern instrumental and bureaucratic imagination, a way of thinking about Catholic education that accepts what similar educational institutions, like elite secular schools, take to be "realistic." Here the *theological* importance of committing *in principle* to free tuition becomes clearer.

Metz and other Christian theologians have rightly emphasized the apocalyptic Christian imagination in the Gospels, daring to hope for the impossible, allowing itself the wonderment of exposure to the radical vision of the reign of God. This vision is a *classless* vision, one that today demands excellence in education for all persons, and prevents Catholic educational institutions from being satisfied with reproducing the American class system. The apocalyptic imagination does not accept what seems "realistic" to modern society, but seeks God's grace in the divine power to do a new thing now, as a symbol of finally making all things new.

The more "realistic" we continue to be, from this perspective, the more students of all classes, especially the poor, will suffer. Even though it is not "realistic," free tuition can be affirmed *in principle* by Catholic colleges and universities. Free tuition, as expression of the reign of God, is blessed apocalypse, both promise and hope.

Whatever the pace of success might be, then, even if a free tuition initiative were to fail, it is the right thing to do. It makes Catholic schools, and by extension the Catholic church, both more faithful to its own ideals and more credible to the outside world. This would be the sole area of Catholic life in which most of American culture would be rooting for us, wanting to see a Catholic institution succeed.

But first one Catholic college or university must step forward, and in so doing make a daring stand for the distinctiveness of what we do, in terms that will likely surprise and fascinate the larger society, a public act of faith that would be—unlike many today—neither sectarian nor shallow. This stand would represent a bold educational identity, deeply Catholic and American.

Beyond Facelessness

Without the space for serious theological reflection, we are faced with a spirituality that licenses violence, with branding as a way of managing violence against the faceless other—that is, the other kept faceless by force. Spirituality and branding do so by outsourcing the hard and unpopular work—the torturing of our suspects, the stitching and sewing of our clothes, the bearing of fantasies about "homosexuality," the loaning of money to students, the paying off of those loans for decades.

What are the powers of violence that our spiritual commitments fail to comprehend? How can those who want to call themselves Christians avoid the demand for the spiritual practice of fostering an anticapitalist, nonviolent relation to God and our sisters and brothers, especially our sisters and brothers whose faces we will and can never see? For too long, the facelessness of the economic and religious other—student, worker, gay priest, terrorist suspect—has kept God faceless. But now Jesus returns to open for us the gospel of Matthew, chapter 25, and says to postmodern, consumer capitalist, American Christians: whatever you did to the most faceless of my sisters and brothers, you did to me. An idoloclastic strain in the Christian tradition may now be married to the ethical demand of our time: Jesus calls us by remaining faceless, by being present in and through our relation to the faceless. Jesus is the faceless man, who is kept anonymous by the way our spirituality fails to challenge our economic and religious practices. Jesus is the faceless man, whose flourishing is pinned, governed by our practices.

Yet early Christianity also described Jesus as a *parrhesiast*, one who spoke confidently, freely, frankly. As a ritual reactivation of the dangerous memory of this *parrhesia*, we can ask, and ask again: How often do student voices about tuition inform university policies? How often do we 'consumers' hear from those who make our computers and cut our flowers? Who speaks for those arrested in the "war on terror"? When have gay priests been encouraged to speak of their reality? Does Christian spirituality search out the face and the voice, not of the random other, but of the other of the body of Christ and of the globalized economic body—the other on whom we depend and to whom we are related through politics, church, or economy?

What would a nonviolent Christian spirituality look like, both in the Catholic world and on the American scene? Might we have to free ourselves from the desire for spirituality itself?

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[1] Tom Beaudoin, *Consuming Faith: Integrating Who We Are With What We Buy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

[2] See Darren C. Marks (ed.), *Shaping a Theological Mind: Theological Context and Methodology* (Burlington, VT: Asgate, 2002); Gesa E. Thiessen and Declan Marmion (eds.), *Theology in the Making: Biography, Contexts, Methods* (Dublin: Veritas, 2005); and the several theologians writing in *Jesuit Postmodern: Scholarship, Vocation, and Identity in the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).

[3] The report from the National Labor Committee is available at http://www.nlcnet.org/article.php?id=239. (Accessed 29 July 2007)
[4] See the essays in Seán Hand (ed.), *The Levinas Reader* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989).
[5] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (translated by Alan Sheridan; New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 272; cf. the French original: Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (Gallimard, 1975), p. 317. The term is not in quotation marks in the French.
[6] *Discipline and Punish*, p. 199.
[7] *Discipline and Punish*, p. 279; *Surveiller et punir*, p. 325. It is Sheridan's translation of *marquages* and *marquée* (from *marquer*, "to mark") as "branding" that first gave me the idea of associating these passages in Foucault with contemporary branding practices.
[8] *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 279-280.
[9] *Discipline and Punish*, p. 281. Dorothy Day, when describing her arrest as an alleged prostitute, says that she was "branded" in that experience, imprinting the status of outcaste on her in a permanent way. See Dorothy Day, *The Long Loneliness* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 100.
[10] Tom Beaudoin, "The Iraq War and Imperial Psychology," *America* 192:2 (17 January 2005), pp. 14-16.
[11] Many contemporary thinkers have treated violence as a theological and religious problem. This is not the place to adequately appreciate the diverse but deeply substantial contributions of such philosophers of religion and violence that have influenced my thinking such as Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, *The Fall to Violence: Original Sin in Relational Theology* (New York: Continuum, 1994); René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Grace Jantzen, *Death and the Displacement of Beauty* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Richard Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987); Wendy Farley, *Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1990). Even more consciously determinative for me have been Bonhoeffer and Metz. There is Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theological life in the face of the violence of Nazi Germany, and the many ways he enacted a theological disobedience in face of both church and state in response to the impossible call of God. Basic references include Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Douglas Stott, Charles C. West, ed. Clifford Green (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2004); Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Eberhard Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography*, ed. Victoria J. Barnett (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2000). There is also Johannes Baptist Metz's theology as theodicy in face of Jewish suffering, his intellectual-spiritual atonement for his own guilt in serving the German army and for Christianity's preparation of the ground for modern anti-semitism. Basic references include Metz, *Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology*, trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury, 1979); Metz, *Faith and the Future: Essays on Theology, Solidarity, and Modernity* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995); Metz, *A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity*, ed. and trans. J. Matthew Ashley (New York: Paulist, 1998); James Matthew Ashley, *Interruptions: Mysticism, Politics, and Theology in the Work of Johann Baptist Metz* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).
[12] J. Joyce Schuld, *Foucault and Augustine: Reconsidering Power and Love* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).
[13] See Jantzen, *Death and the Displacement of Beauty*.
[14] Searches using www.google.com on 15 February 2006.
[15] Carrette and King, *Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
[16] For a provocative recent journalistic essay on the tensions involved in America's self-proclaimed Christianity, see Bill McKibben, "The Christian Paradox: How a Faithful Nation Gets Jesus Wrong," *Harper's Magazine*, August 2005, pp. 31-37.
[17] Bob Herbert, "No Justice, No Peace," *New York Times*, 23 February 2006, p. A27.
[18] From a statement made to the American Civil Liberties Union, excerpted in "Extraordinary Rendition," *Harper's Magazine*, February 2006, pp. 21-22, 24.
[19] Ian Austen, "Deported Canadian Was No Threat, Report Shows," *New York Times*, 10 August 2007, p. A9.
[20] Anthony Lagouranis, "Tortured Logic," *New York Times*, 28 February 2006, p. A23.
[21] I borrow the phrase from bioethicist Steven Miles. See the interview with him, "The Torture-Endangered Society," by Richard Thieme, in *National Catholic Reporter*, 13 January 2006, pp. 12-14, at p. 14.

[22] Kate Zernike, "Detainees Describe Abuses by Guard in Iraq Prison," *The New York Times*, 12 January 2005, at www.nytimes.com (accessed 15 August 2007).
[23] George Steiner, *Lessons of the Masters* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 14.
[24] I am grateful to the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities for their provision of data.
[25] See the 2006-2007 "Trends in College Pricing" report at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost06/trends_college_pricing_06.pdf (accessed 30 July 2007).
[26] See *Conversations on Jesuit Higher Education*, "Marketing and Mission," no. 25 (Spring 2004).
[27] Those who defend the use of branding in Catholic higher education most often say that the church or Catholic schools have the right to use what the larger society uses, and put it to better uses. In this reading, "branding" is essentially politically and theologically neutral, and depending on the intentions of the institution, can be used for either good or ill. But as both Foucault and the experience of contemporary capitalism shows, branding is a form of social control built on exploitation, trafficking in violence. It encourages not an economy of grace, but of force: whether the psychological coercion of advertising or the physical coercion of the sweatshop. This does not mean that our religious institutions do not try to brand us in particular ways. But insofar as those practices share in the forms of power that structure corporate branding, they are at least proto-violent. And no incipiently violent form of relationship should be undertaken by Christians without quite serious pause.
[28] Anya Kamenetz, *Generation Debt: Why Now is a Terrible Time to Be Young* (New York: Riverhead, 2006).
[29] See the discussion in Neil Howe and Bill Strauss, *Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation* (New York: Vintage, 2000).
[30] See Fr. Kolvenbach's 2000 address at Santa Clara University, "The Service of Faith and the Promotion of Justice in American Jesuit Higher Education," at http://www.scu.edu/ignatiancenter/bannan/eventsandconferences/justiceconference/nationalconference/kolvenbach.cfm (accessed 30 July 2007).
[31] John W. O'Malley, *The First Jesuits* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 219.
[32] There can never be too much remembering of what we know of the basic facts: According to the official John Jay study, between 1950 and 2002 there were allegations of sexual abuse against 4392 priests, made by some 10,667 people. According to their best estimates, approximately 4% of priests have been accused. It is highly likely that not all victims have yet come forward (indeed, "more than 25% of the allegations were made more than 30 years after the alleged abuse began" (see the Executive Summary, p. 7)). See also the "Supplementary Data Analysis" of 2006. The original 2004 report may be found at http://www.usccb.org/nrb/johnjaystudy/ (accessed 30 July 2007). The supplementary report may be found at http://www.usccb.org/ocyp/JohnJayReport.pdf (accessed 30 July 2007)