Religion and Politics in the UkraineSee also Eastern Europe, Russia/Belarus. 1. Brief Introduction 1. Brief Introduction to Religion and Politics in the Ukraine The Ukraine has a population of just over 45 million, with a negative population growth rate of -.62%. It had a 2010 HDI ranking of #69 and a low 2010 CPI ranking of 2.4. The CIA Factbook (est. 2006) lists the Ukraine as 50.4% Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP); 26.1% Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP); 8% Greek Catholic; 7.2% Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC); 2.2% Roman Catholic; 2.2% Protestant; .6% Jewish; and 3.2% other. On ethnicity, the 2001 census listed 77.8% Ukrainian and 17.3% Russian. These statistics alert us to several dynamics. First, historically the Ukraine has been divided between the Western (Poland-Lithuania, Austria) and Eastern (Russian) European civilizations. Huntington calls it a cleft country for that reason. We would thus expect tensions between the Western and Eastern sections of the country both religiously and politically. Second, the various strands of Orthodox Christianity alert us to the fact that some parts of this religious tradition will focus on the Moscow Patriarch and some on Kiev, with many variations. The Greek Catholic Church began in 1596 when many Orthodox were pressured by their Polish rulers to join the Roman Catholic Church while keeping their non-Latin liturgy. Third, since this is a post-Communist country, the population will have a higher percentage of people who left religious practice altogether, but they might remain “culturally Orthodox,” similar to the Russian experience. Pope John Paul II tried to bring reconciliation of Catholics and Orthodox, and among Orthodox, when he visited the country in June 2001. Ukrainian Orthodox Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev welcomed the pope, but Moscow Patriarch Aleksey II criticized the visit. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, under fire for corruption and lack of economic progress, invited the pope to emphasize his country’s desire to join Europe, which the pope supported. When Kuchma decided not to pursue a third term, the two leading candidates represented the two sections of the country. Viktor A. Yushchenko had his major support in the West and advocated joining the E.U. Viktor F. Yanukovich came from the East and was supported by Putin. Yanukovich won in a tainted election, which was then overturned by the Orange Revolution demonstrations in Kiev backed by E.U. diplomatic initiatives. In the following vote, Yushchenko won 52% and became president in December 2004. Yushchenko made his first visit to Moscow to try to repair relations with Putin since the Ukraine depends on Moscow for trade and natural gas. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine Party declined, however, in the parliamentary vote of March 2006. After a long series of negotiations, Yanukovich became prime minister on August 4, 2006. It is clear that the future of the Ukraine depends on both tendencies within the country and on the European Union and Russia. In the election of October 2007, Yanukovich's Party of the Regions won 175 of the parliament's 450 seats, with Ms. Tymoshenko's Bloc Tymoshenko at 156 and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine at 72. Those with support in the Western part of the country, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, then formed a coalition to make Tymoshenko prime minister. But the two leaders had a history of making deals that collapsed. Yanukovich won the presidential election of February 2010 over Tymoshenko. Kuzio ("Muddling Along," below) summarizes, "Democratic reform will inevitably be evolutionary" because of regionalism and the lack of a firm offer to join the E.U. "The upside of this is that regional diversity by its nature in Ukraine makes it difficult for any political force to monopolize power, hence the generally fair February 2010 election. The down side is that consensus politics leads to muddled progress in reform." The global economic downturn has also significantly hurt the nation's manufacturing sphere, and Yanukovich has increased coercive pressure against Tymoshenko and her colleagues in the current Russian model (see February 2011 article below). Hanson (2006) discusses “Western Christianity and the Byzantine Empire” (pp. 98-101); and “Orthodox Europe in the Post-Communist Period” (pp. 150-55). 2. A Short Introductory Course to Religion and Politics in the Ukraine Perica discusses the ambiguity of the Orthodox tradition, both part of Europe and alienated from some of its values. Perica explains the differences by the historical experiences of the Byzantine “caesaropapism” and the Ottoman millet, both of which identified the church with national identity. Davis discusses the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, a major religious actor in the Ukraine. Byrnes explains transnational Roman Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe. Kuzio analyses the current state of the political system after the Orange Revolution and the elections of 2006 and 2007. Vasim brings everything up to date with excellent coverage of inter-confessional and church-state relations, especially involving the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO). The section on inter-Orthodox relations, pp. 33-35, is particularly good. Perica, Vjekoslav, “The politics of ambivalence: Europeanization and the Serbian Orthodox Church,” in Byrnes, Timothy A., and Katzenstein, Peter J. Religion in an Expanding Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 176-203. Davis, Nathaniel. A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1995). Byrnes, Timothy A. Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). Chapters One, Two (Poland), Three (Hungarian Minorities), Four (Croatia), Five. Kuzio, Taras, "Ukraine: Muddling Along," Wolchik, Sharon L, and Curry, Jane L., eds. Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 339-67. Vasim, Maksym. "Chracteristics of Development of Inter-Confessional Relations in Ukraine," Religion in Eastern Europe XXX, No. 1 (February 2010): 29-36. 3. Other Key Resource Materials for Religion and Politics in the Ukraine Byrnes, Timothy A., and Katzenstein, Peter J. Religion in an Expanding Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See throughout, but especially Chapters Six (Ramet, Orthodoxy and its “Idyllic Past”), Seven (Perica, “Serbian Orthodox Chruch”). Ellis, Jane. The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986). Emerson, Michael. Redrawing the Map of Europe (London: Macmillian Press, 1998). Emerson situates this geographic area in the general context of Europe. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Mojzes, Paul, and Swindler, Leonard. “Interreligious Dialogue Toward Reconciliation in Macedonia and Bosnia,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 39, Vol. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 2002). Ramet, Pedro. ed. Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies: Christianity Under Stress Volume 2 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990). Ramet, Pedro. Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987). 4. Recent News Articles on the Ukraine “Why the Fever in the Ukraine? A Few Not-So-Easy Answers,” New York Times, December 22, 2004. Why did the Orange Revolution succeed in overturning fraudulent election? “Yushchenko Wins 52% of Vote; Rival Vows a Challenge,” New York Times, December 28, 2004. “How Ukraine’s Top Spies Changed the Nation’s Path,” New York Times, January 17, 2005. Role of intelligence services in success of Orange Revolution. “Ukraine Leader Fires Cabinet as Reform Coalition Splits,” New York Times, September 9, 2005. President Yushchenko fires Prime Minister Tymoshenko. “Reform Leader Suffers Setback in Ukraine Vote,” New York Times, March 27, 2006. Both Yanukovich and Tymoshenko’s parties did much better than the president’s. The vote reflected Yushchenko’s poor economic showing and the winter shortages of Russian gas. “6 Weeks After Ukrainian Vote, It’s Unclear Who Won,” New York Times, May 13, 2006. In 450-seat parliament, Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions holds 186, Tymoshenko’s 129, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine 81, Socialists 33, Communists 21. No majority yet. “Putin Favorite Ee-emerging in Ukraine: 2005 Election Loser Gathers Support,” New York Times, July 19, 2006. Communists and Socialists throw their support behind Victor F. Yanukovich, which may make possible parliamentary coalition. President Viktor A. Yushchenko said that if that happened, he would take his One Ukraine party into opposition, not join a broad governing coalition. “Ukraine in Uneasy Power Balance as Premier Is Approved,” New York Times, August 5, 2006. Yanukovich becomes prime minister with votes of 273 of 296 members of the 450-seat parliament present. "Ukrainian Prime Minister, Once Seen as Archvillain, Reinvents Himself," New York Times, September 30, 2007. Old Soviet bureaucrat, with the help of American consultant Paul J. Manafort, gains popularity by presenting himself as an anticorruption reformer who wants to bring the Ukraine closer to the West. "Orange Revolution Parties Will Share Power in Ukraine," New York Times, October 16, 2007. Parliamentary election results. "Slavic Rivals Embroiled in Church Rift," New York Times, July 30, 2008. At 1,020th celebration of founding of Orthodoxy in Kiev, Ukrainian president Yushchenko calls for an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Russian leaders, including Patriarch Aleksy II, oppose. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was non-committal, warning against "problematic consequences for Ukraine's future." State and church was absorbed by Russia under Peter the Great. Bishop Yevstratiy, spokesman for Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev Patriarchate, which Moscow Patriarchate has declared heretical, "How can you live like neighbors when your neighbor says the house you live in is not your own house, but our common house?" There is also another autonomous Orthodox church and Roman Catholics to consider. For the continuation of the story under the new Russian Patriarch Kirill, see Vasim above. "Russian Actions Reignite Tensions Over Strategic Port in Ukraine," New York Times, August 25, 2008. Tensions over naval base Sevastopol in the Crimea. "Ukraine's Political Paralysis Gives Black Eyes to Orange Revolution Heroes," New York Times, June 23, 2009. Dysfunction in government with feuding between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. The latter even sought an alliance with Yanukovich, but it failed. "In Ukraine, '04 Euphoria Has Turned to Despair," New York Times, November 19, 2009. Disillusionment, especially in the Western Ukraine, with Orange Revolution of 2004. "For Kremlin, Ukraine Vote Cuts 2 Ways," New York Times, February 9, 2010. Putin is pleased with the presidential victory of Yanukovich, but not that the process was competitive and democratically fair. As Yushchenko's first visit was to Russia, Yanukovich first visited the European Union, both seeking to assuage the "foreign loser" in their elections. "'Hero of Ukraine' Splits the Nation," New York Times, March 2, 2010. As one of last acts, President Yushchenko named the highly controversial Stepan Bandera, a World War II partisan, as a national hero. Some Westerners so honor him, but some people from the East call him a Nazi puppet. "Catholic renaissance in Ukraine may be at risk," National Catholic Reporter, June 11, 2010. Interview with Fr. Borys Gudziak, president of Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, on a visit from the Security Service of the Ukraine (SBU) on May 18. The Greek Catholic Church has had a renaissance with more clergy and about ten percent of the population (2010 est.). It played a key role in the "Orange Revolution" of 2004. The May 23 Economist also covered the visit, the long term meaning of which is unclear. "Ukraine Intensifies Pressure on the Opposition," New York Times, February 10, 2011. Yanukovich's attack on Tymoshenko and colleagues, e.g., former economic minister Bohdan M. Danylyshyn has been granted asylum in the Czech Republic. August 18, 2011. |
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