The bankruptcy trustee, though not named in the caption of the opinion, is one plaintiff.  When a debtor (such as Dallas Masterson) files what is now known as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy court appoints a bankruptcy trustee, a person given the power and obligation by bankruptcy law to gather assets belonging to the debtor (other than some assets designated as exempt, such as the debtor's clothes), liquidate those assets, and distribute the proceeds to the debtor's unsecured creditors.  In this case, the trustee claimed as one of the debtor's assets the debtor's right to exercise an option to purchase some land.   If the option price is $50,000 (as the evidence suggested), but the land is now worth $150,000 (net of real estate commissions and other costs of sale), the trustee could gain $100,000 for unsecured creditors by exercising the option and then selling the land.  In this case, perhaps based on a real estate appraisal, the trustee must have concluded that the ranch was worth more than the amount of money necessary to exercise the option.  If the trustee had concluded that the option was worthless (e.g. the land was still worth only $50,000) it seems likely that the trustee would have "abandoned" the asset (as having no value for the bankruptcy estate) rather than hiring a lawyer to litigate the matter. 

     The issue considered in this opinion is whether the trial court should have excluded evidence that would have shown an agreement by the Mastersons and the Sines that only the Mastersons, and not a potential assignee of the option (such as a bankruptcy trustee), could exercise the option.  Under bankruptcy law enacted by Congress 18 years later, in 1978, an agreement precluding assignment of the option would no longer be effective to preclude the trustee from exercising such an option. In other words, had the case arisen after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the offered evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and the parol evidence issue would not have been raised. 

     Rebecca Masterson is the other plaintiff.  She also wants the ability to exercise the option, but it is not clear why.  Nor is it clear what would happen if both she and the trustee are entitled to exercise the option.  In that eventuality, the trustee would be a successor in interest under bankruptcy law to the husband's right to exercise the option and therefore could exercise the option in the same manner and to the same extent as the husband might have exercised the option had the husband not filed bankruptcy.  But to what extent could the husband have exercised the option?  Would he have had an option to repurchase only his original co-tenancy interest (e.g. 50%) or would he have had an option to repurchase a fee simple interest in the property if he chose to exercise the option prior to his wife's decision to exercise the option?  Those questions would be answered if the original option agreement expressly answered them.  But remember that this option agreement was oral, seemingly informal, and thought by the dissent really to be manufactured after the fact.  Under those circumstances the parties are likely not to have addressed those questions.  A court would therefore have to decide what the parties most likely would have agreed had they considered the question.

     Plaintiffs name the Sines as defendants because plaintiffs want a court declaration to bind the Sines.  Unless the Sines wanted the land to stay in the family, they might have been indifferent to who could exercise the option, because they would get the same amount no matter who exercised the option.  Moreover, the Sines do care about the amount to be paid for exercise of the option and want to be sure that they don't sell the land to the wrong person.