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Max L. Stackhouse


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
## Globalization, Public Theology, and New Means of Grace<sup>1</sup>

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## The Issue

Globalization is, in some senses, a very old phenomenon. Its earliest roots are in the spread of humanity from a very local environment to the far reaches of the earth, changing the flora and fauna, indeed the air, water and soil wherever they went. And later, the globalizing effects of such trade routes as the Old Silk Road, tied Asia to Europe, with shipping links that carried not only goods, but ideas, arts, technologies, seeds, weapons, diseases, plus religious convictions from East to West and West to East, with trader paths extending south to Semitic and African regions and north to Slavic and Nordic regions, centuries before Christ and lasting well into the West's Middle Ages. The later story is better known: sailing ships with new methods of navigation brought exploratory, military, colonial and missionary activity to these and still other regions, and eventually to the New World. Each of these developments increased the rapidity of the globalizing process, anticipating what is happening now.

However, the current form of globalization is new, in part because of its magnitude and in part because of its character. It is not only expanding our sense of the public world, it is creating a material infrastructure on a scale that could eventuate in a world civilization with a common virtual world of images and information that is, in principle, accessible to all. To be sure, some people still think of the "public" only as having to do with politics, but globalization is not a government project, and no political regime can comprehend the public it engenders. Indeed, the emerging global institutions of regulation and development, such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, etc., transcend any government's program. In fact it is a frequent accusation against them that they are unregulated by any political order and are too much influenced by the interests of multinational economic interests.

More frequently, people think of globalization primarily in terms of the international spread of these corporations and of capitalism more generally, which they usually understand in terms derived from either neo-Marxist categories of class-conflict (now less the international proletariat vs bourgeoisie than the "first" vs the "third" worlds or the "North" vs the "South" or "The West" and "The Rest"), in which the exploited or developing peoples of the world stand against the Neo-liberal "Washington Consensus" (*laissez-faire* economics which they often identify with Adam Smith, backed by American neo-imperialist power). Neither Marxist nor the Neo-liberal are today generally trusted to lead the world to a better future, even if many feel that they somehow ought morally to side with the proletarian "Rest" against the American-led "West". The distrust derives from the suspicion that the one always seems

to move toward a system that cannot efficiently produce, and the other always seems to move toward a system that does not (or will not) equitably distribute, and both seem to violate the ecosystem.<sup>2</sup>

Such views are partially right, for many countries which have suffered from colonialism and have emerged from it by strong nationalist movements find now that their national political efforts to control their own destinies are compromised by the trans-nationalist efforts to extend the international economic interests that are at work in globalization. Further, in the perception of many, the gap between the rich and the powerful on the one hand and the poor and the powerless on the other seems to increase. I say "seems to" for the hard evidence for that is inconclusive, controverted, and subject to interpretation by ideological use of the data. As I read it, very high percentages of the world's population are moving up economically, and while some are moving much more rapidly than others, and large numbers are being left behind, the most remarkable change is the emergence of new middle classes increasingly demanding a voice in their societies and expressing a concern for the environment. These new middle classes are being created precisely in those countries which have most energetically opened themselves to global influences, while the greatest poverty remains in those countries most closed to or inaccessible to globalizing forces.<sup>3</sup> It appears to be so that the peak percentages of those who are at the very top of income and wealth distribution are further removed from those at the bottom than at any time in recent history, this is in part a function of the fact that more and more countries of the world have decided that private institutions do a better job of forming and deploying capital than do states. Meanwhile, those governments that seek to control economies are being reshaped by global influences, and the rather raw forms of mercantilism posing as capitalism have, in authoritarian environments, increasingly replaced communism as the economy of choice, aiding local development somewhat but increasing inequality. The shifts are effecting every subsistence, feudal, and socialist economy, and making the meager skills of the least developed peoples obsolete. It is not a pretty picture, although it is likely to be temporary.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, more determinative forces than purely economic ones are at work in technology, medicine, law, and education, forces that make the economic changes viable, and through the complex of developments, as Roland Robertson has famously said, "the whole world is becoming one place." It is now an inclusive field of spaces, peoples, cultures, institutions, practices and activities that leaves no context untouched. Every contextual mode of analysis now must take account of this comprehensive context, and each local context is "glocalizing" as aspects of the global forces indigenize and as people from local societies

are drawn into wider frames of reference, drifting, for example into the exploding mega-cities of the earth and becoming part of the ganglia of the growing global network of interaction, information, exchange, and creativity. All this, is not, however, homogenizing culture, as many fear; for as local and global influences interact, new pluralizing syntheses are being worked out. People re-invent their traditions, selectively adopting practices, values, clothing, cuisines, and technical resources from “foreign” societies and from their own traditions, as presumed universals become modulated by being indigenized and flowering in new ways in local soils and newly constructed syntheses. All of this has as many implications for religion, as religion does for the dynamics themselves.<sup>5</sup>

Those who see globalization only as an economic development extending rapacious capitalism or only as a current political development that tends toward a new imperialism are viewing the realities all can see too narrowly, for these frequent ways of interpreting these changes are rooted in dubious interpretive understandings of how history works. The glasses most frequently used to read the situation need re-grinding, and this is one of the key tasks of intellectuals who wrestle with the empirical, the ethical and the spiritual realities of this new socio-historical context. Seen through other lens, the decisive current changes are largely derivative of dynamics that are obscured by the older spectacles. I refer specifically to the impact of religious and theological developments that are reversing the number of presumptions about how history works, such as the view that the world is “progressively” becoming more secular and that the “real” forces that drive development are always material – economic or political.<sup>6</sup>

In fact, old religious traditions have gradually re-worked their way to dominant influence, and new constellations of resurgent religion are interacting as cultural forces with political, economic realities to form a myriad of new combinations of local and global syntheses – in what Berger and Huntington have identified as “many globalizations.”<sup>7</sup> Together they generate a vast, world-wide complex of extremely diversified, highly unpredictable, rapidly changing, dynamics that comprehend and transform every particular contextual reality and creates the fragile prospect of a global civilization, one more complex and differentiated than the world has ever known, one that adopts traditional diversities into its ever-extending net, one that has no obvious singularly coherent center. This is what we must try to understand both to know what is going on and to find the handles to guide the development responsibly, so far as possible.

The main purpose of this paper is precisely this: to draw upon neglected resources, largely from religious insights, that enable us to refine

the ways by which we can understand the various powers and spheres of life that are emerging under globalizing conditions and to relate these to the fundamental bases of ethics in such a way that it can and should guide our responses to this very complex reality. This implies that to grasp and guide current global dynamics we must seek a viewpoint that in some sense transcends the world itself, one that allows us, at least in a thought experiment, to see something of the whole. The indispensable social sciences that study this phenomenon seldom recognize the fact that religious and ethical forces are profoundly behind much of what is going on, or that they, even more than these sciences themselves, seek to grasp things whole. But we cannot see the swamp and know it is a swamp simply by immersing oneself ever the more deeply in it. We need perspective plus an intimate familiarity with a variety of habitats. Then we can begin to recognize the multiplicity of forces that made this environment different from other ones and set forth hypotheses as to how life works everywhere. To understand a world phenomenon, one needs a worldview, what some call a “metaphysical-moral vision” of the world, which is ever, at least in part, a matter of faith – the kind of faith that is able to present publically examinable arguments that it is a viable one to hold.

I am suggesting, in other words, that a theological view, one that is rooted in a comprehending view that relativizes every particular context in principle without violating the particularities found, has slowly produced what is now appearing before us in both material and virtual reality. Key motifs from the legacy of the Hebraic, and thus also of the Christian theological, heritage (and, in certain respects of derivative Islamic traditions), knew long ago of a single created realm where all peoples lived in a multiplicity of contexts under a singular divine law and toward a variety of divinely appointed ends in history and beyond. Parallel ideas were to some degree present in tribal, Taoist, Confucian and classic Greco-Roman philosophies, with parallels to some schools of theistic Hinduism, although usually without the notion of a just and loving creator God as the source and norm of the realities these traditions sought to interpret. Many of these latter great traditions focused on the idea of Nature or cosmic reality, not as a created artifact, but as the primal source and norm of both society and religion. Thus, only some of the great world-views, those rooted in a transcendent God, have had a sense of a reality that is other than the way things are and that nevertheless comprehends creation and history. Even the view that modified the naturalistic sensibilities in the West by the idea of one humanity with each made in God’s image, living in the one complex and sinful world, which the one yet triune God created, commanded, and commissioned by is old and in principle universal, even if it is not acknowledged everywhere and by everyone. It

points to a reality more public, more globally encompassing than any particular political or economic system is, any culture can be, and, indeed, than any naturalistic conception of the cosmos could imagine.

It is not only the case that religion is related to the dynamics of globalization, it is the claim that something more powerful than nature is behind the religious convictions of the world and that both that reality and people's belief about it shape politics, economics and culture, and that this reality is not, in any ordinary sense of the word, simply "natural". In ordinary language, we refer to that reality as "God," and need to explore whether and how God is related to globalization. Of course, even if believers hold that God is behind all that goes on, we must admit that in regard to globalization the connections, if true, are valid in very unsorted ways. In my view, that is why our faiths and our theologies based on them, and any social ethics legitimated by those theologies, must be public. That is, they must not only take up global issues, in the sense that it give us the motivation, courage and worldview to address the global problems that are arising, but to discern, so far as we are able, any divine intent, principles or purposes in the very phenomenon of globalization and to evaluate the relative adequacy of various religious responses to globalization – in so far as we can do so fairly.

Thus, I think we must speak not only of ethics for a much expanded public, but of an ethic funded by a "public theology." I mean by that, a kind of theology that generates a faith-full worldview, recovers and recasts certain pertinent historic themes in the history of theology that bear on globalization, and challenges any trends in theology that sees all normative claims as privileged to specific gender, ethnic, social, or convictional groups. It is widely held, today, that we each have our own personal theology. Further, each communion of faith has its own confessional theology. The various streams and factions of the Christian tradition, for example, each has its own modes of thought, patterns of worship, and ecclesiastical polity. All the various denominations can today be seen as so many "orders," some of which seem to carry out their ministries best outside of the Mother Church. And yet, we can recognize the family resemblance of these streams and factions, and that each shares certain elements that are indispensable to the faith as a whole, even if not always properly believed and practiced. Wherever these become predominant and enduring, they shape the common life and the wider worlds of culture, politics and economics, and, indeed, begin to constitute those great religio-social worldviews that shape civilizations. And when the ways in which they do so have fundamental implications for all of humanity, they become the focus of inter-religious deliberation and debate. Indeed,

the most important way of studying these great religions is a critical public theology, one deeply informed by comparative philosophy, ethics, and social theory. This dimension of theology has only sometimes been developed and propagated in our colleges and seminaries, in our ecclesiastical councils, and in our missionary efforts as they reached around the world, yet it has become indispensable in a globalizing era. Exposure to Christian worldviews, and indeed to the forces of globalization partially prompted by them, has encouraged several of the other world religions to articulate their faiths in revisionist terms that also approximate a public theology.

It is important to develop a "public theology" today, because of certain trends in contemporary religion to the contrary. One is the peril of Fundamentalistic movements. The growth of Islamist conviction in the Arabic world, of Hindu nationalism in India, of Buddhist militance in Myanmar and parts of Japan,<sup>8</sup> of both pre-millennialist dispensationalism and "Radical Orthodoxy" in Christianity tend to obscure the greater forms of these traditions and to set the religious agenda for an inevitably "clash of civilizations," to use the phrase Huntington made famous.<sup>9</sup> Another is sectarianism, reinforced by the relativism of post-modern thinking, against any thought of a master narrative. In Christian circles, this appears in a misbegotten ignoring of John 3:16-17, so that it is held that God sent Christ into the world to save the church, and not the world, and that the chief function of the church that follows Christ is to condemn the world. It is of course a great thing to bring souls into the church and to strengthen communities of faith, but this tendency is today being advanced in Christian circles in ways that end up retreating from the obligation of serious theology to also provide the moral and spiritual inner architecture for shaping the common life, including today the globalizing environment. Comparable tendencies are also a temptation of other world religions – sometimes in the form of reactionary re-tribalization that wants to freeze-dry local religio-cultural traditions against change or more comprehensive views of reality. Still a third peril is the credibility of many church leaders. I refer not only to sexual and financial scandals that discredit religious leadership, but to the fact that few have sought to develop a profound public theology able to address the questions that globalization pose should be.

"Globalization" as a dynamic process suggests not only that the whole world can be conceived as "one place," a single reality, but as a reality involved in a process of change, so that will transcend its present reality. It presumes an "already" and "old" nature, indeed a *kosmos* and *oikoumene*, that are necessary and enduring, but incomplete, flawed,

unfinished, or distorted; and a “not yet,” something “new,” that is at least promised and possibly coming into being. The question is whether this may, or must, be seen as related to a divine intent. The New Testament conveys just such views with an idea of “the world” as something that is created by God and thus good, but which is fallen, distorted in its operations, incomplete and imperfect, and thus is something to which we are not to conform, even though we cannot in this life depart from the deepest structure of its very being without extinction. Yet, “the world” is also something that God so loved that it is being redeemed, and those who know God also know that they are sent into it, not to conform to it, but to aid in its process of redemption, to become agents in its potential transformation toward a new creation and a new civilization. We are to participate in the Kingdom that is within us and among us as it presses and points toward a New Jerusalem, a symbol of a complex divine city to which all the peoples of the earth bring their gifts.

Those who receive the vision of this promised reign of God are to employ every moral means to make it actual. This cluster of convictions has periodically become central to Christian conviction, and has emerged into most intense consciousness when people find themselves experiencing and seeking to guide massive social change. Where it has been strongest, the intentional restructuring of the world, selves, and society by conversion, reconstruction, technology, and social transformation becomes a moral duty.<sup>10</sup> That is a second reason why a public theology is required as we consider globalization, for this cluster of convictions stands deep behind the contemporary dynamics of globalization. In our best understandings of creation and redemption, we can see God at work in globalization. Indeed, at the World Missionary Conference of 1910, as the effects of the new trans-continental cables were first being realized, and the massive effects of industrialization and urbanization were visible to nearly all, the great scholar and missionary, J. N. Farquhar, spoke for many of those first recognizing the dynamic of what we now call globalization: “We have entered a new era.... The nations have become one city; we buy each other’s goods, ...we think each other’s thoughts, ...we begin to hear the music of humanity.”<sup>11</sup>

He echoed, then, what the biblical record promised; he failed to see, however, how the powers generated by such developments could also be distorted by sin into colonialism and imperialism, which accompanied the missionary movement and modernization, and how the response to these could also spur reactionary movements. Mixing peoples, cultures, and religions offended both the neo-pagans and radical secularizers of the last century. The radical right and the radical left attached sacred meaning to their own “blood and soil” or class, and interpreted them in terms of

the idyllic memories of a lost primal community.<sup>12</sup> And the technologies that had made the new internationalism possible could generate both new methods of productivity and economic interdependency and new possibilities of destructive weaponry, both of which in turn uprooted traditional cultures. The “music of humanity,” of which Farquhar spoke, was soon disrupted by a cacophony of military marches and accompanied by the percussion of bombs in history’s shortest half-century, 1914-1946, and history’s shortest century, 1918-1989, when modern social, political and economic ideologies, nearly all of them anti-religious, clashed in World Wars, hot and cold. The most important transitions are seldom by smooth progress, and almost never without resistance and storms of threatened apocalypse.

Yet, Farquhar’s forecast turned out to be essentially true: the pagan right and the secular left, the twin enemies of the democracy, human rights, economic freedom, and the humane use of technology were defeated. And each of these developments, which they opposed, were not only stamped by strands of the Christian view of a universal faith, but became instrumental in the defeat of these struggles to contain these globalizing forces. As a result, history became increasingly planetary. Now, no state can be fully sovereign, no economy whole within itself, and no culture entirely self-contained, while religion is in resurgence everywhere. This is now the context in which we now think, work, pray and play, and seek to carry out our vocations. It now comprehends many specific locales and sub-cultures only partially linked in a dynamic pluralism. Life, is now not only simultaneously global and local, it is also ecumenical and contextual, catholic and congregational, in part because we live in a period of “the compression of the world,” which, in spite of America’s role as a super-power, is not only multipolar politically (with temporary hegemonies which lesser powers cooperate to restrain), but multi-cultural, and increasingly linked technologically, economically, politically, culturally, and morally – even if some are, at least for now, left out since it is all happening, as John Paul II has pointed out, “over their heads” – a telling phrase that indicates not only that they do not understand what is going on, but that these developments are pressing down on them.

I fully recognize that the United States, as the only remaining superpower, is tempted in this context to a new imperialism. We do not yet know whether the world’s only remaining superpower will become, by choice or by accident, at least for a time the new hegemonic power – following in the train of old Rome, the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, the British Empire (in competition with Dutch, Spanish, French, and German) that in the midst of the modern European balance of powers kept a semblance of peace, fostered the economic development of the

West, and, it must be said, eventuated in colonialism – if the nations with dynamic cultures could not expand at home because they were constrained by their neighbors, they expanded abroad in a series of competing empires. But most Americans are not eager to take this role. They do not see ourselves as an empire, either solo or as one of several. They do not aspire to rule the world, we don't want to take responsibility for every rogue nation or petty tyrant, every ethnic war or territorial conflict, even if the role is thrust upon us because the USA is the only serious military power and because, since World War II, it has already established bases around the world and other countries, living under the defense umbrella of American troops and weaponry, have allowed their own military prowess to wither. Besides, if we are to become a military power, it will cost. And there are enough residues of isolationist Americanism around that people will not want to pay for other people's problems. Most would prefer to be loved and admired, and to get on with the business of business, expanding the world economy and making everyone better off. Furthermore, the forms of faith that in the past helped develop the inner moral architecture for guiding public affairs have fallen silent or become ideological. Religion, in the dominant evangelical modes that converts souls and establishes local megachurches, has no intrinsic social philosophy – although some are turning to certain Roman Catholic or Reformed models.<sup>13</sup> And both the “mainline” Protestant and radical Catholic voices focus on “liberation” in all things, but do not specify how the institutional life of humanity could be ordered. A new “Americanist” cultural arrogance fills the gap.

What are we then to think and to do about such a situation? Obviously, we must advocate for and provide resources through public and private charitable channels to those who are left behind, and support those who work directly with those left behind. But another level of intellectual and organizational work also needs to be done. And on this front, the only way to grasp what is going on is to recognize the insight of the world religions that life is not only governed by the material forces that determine much of life – nature and the lusts for power, wealth and the desire for things – but also by immaterial realities. I refer to those spiritual energies capable of evoking loyalties and channeling freedom that grab our souls and possess the *esprit de corps* of our social organizations. In many cultures and sub-cultures, people live in a world of enchanted powers – a world populated by spirits that can be invoked, demons that must be exorcized, or charms and curses that may be used. Elaborate systems develop around these concerns, and every religion has adherents who use even their faith in such ways, even if clergy discourage it. To be sure, some “super-personal forces of good and evil”<sup>14</sup> are identified in other terms by the modern social sciences. They speak of “complexes” or of

“totems” and “taboos,” or report on ideas of “fate,” “fortune,” “karma,” “kismet,” etc., as believed by one or another cultural and religious tradition, although they do not believe that any cosmic logic or supra-natural force really determines behavior. Today, genetics, social location, and economic interests, plus various “isms” or “archetypal patterns” developed through evolution are taken as explanations of the powers that make us do what we do. All these tell us that we have no choice but to live out what these powers dictate. Concerns about the powers vary from person to person, culture to culture, and epoch to epoch; but they are always present. Psychology, anthropology, and sociology must, I believe, face the issues they pose; but only a theological view can touch the depths needed to see what is at stake in globalization. And here we can see at least one dimension of reality named by the ancient faith as “powers, principalities, authorities, thrones, and dominions.” These terms point toward the driving energies that are real in social history and now again exposed by globalization, for the traditions that ordered them are being fundamentally deconstructed. But these “forces,” these “powers” need redefinition.

Among the most salient of the powers for our questions are what we have called the “Principalities.” Traditionally viewed as personified angelic spirits that rebelled against their Creator and thus become distorted into demonic, idolatrous forms, and today viewed often as totally impersonal psycho-social forces, the terms *eros*, *mammon*, *mars*, and the *muses* point to inchoate, animating realities that are present in every known society. They are, more or less, always ethically constrained, challenged or channeled by religion, which, if it successfully allowed a proper place for them, tended to harness these powers so that they would contribute to an enduring civilization in which life can flourish. These powers are constrained, challenged and channeled by the religious legitimation of institutional matrices that provide moral and spiritual housing for them. Thus, normative forms of family life with their patterned ways of relating males and females and parents and children channel *eros*, and if this power is not channeled, family life and sexual behavior becomes destructive, not constructive. Similarly, dominant arrangements of the division of labor with modes of approved production and distribution order *mammon*, and if these are woven into responsible institutional orders, exploitation, corruption, and deception becomes the common coin of economic life. In the same way, political authority with a legally and morally bound power to exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion controls violence when it invades from abroad or erupts from within, but unconstrained *mars* becomes unconstrained militarism. And culture-defining narratives and images (folk-tales; national epics; traditional dances, painting, sculptural, architecture and musics) and whole languages

with idioms provide possibilities of communication and the clarification of meanings; but without a sense that the muses can be creative under higher principles and purposes than to deconstruct meanings, they become a babble of idolatrous frauds.

These are the primary spheres that are functional prerequisites of existence in every society, necessary for viable community. They contain and provide the social-ethical space for those powers that can grasp the soul and become obsessive forces in the lives of people or sub-cultures – becoming part of what the biblical tradition calls “the Principalities,” as already mentioned. None of the prevailing ways of constraining, challenging, and channeling the primal powers of eros, mammon, mars and the muses – that is, family, economy, politics, and culture – are comprehensible without attention to the way these institutional spheres of life are religiously shaped in every culture, and the fact that they nevertheless have a tendency to assert their own potency and meanings against any constraining, challenging or channeling limits. To use biblical language, these angelic powers can make idols of their own potency and thus become demonic. One can no more understand the prevailing patterns of familial, economic, political or cultural life in India without attention to Hinduism, or in the Arabic world without attention to Islam, or the East Asian world without reference to the Confucian tradition, or the West without attention to Christianity than one can grasp the corrupt subcultures of any of these lands when eros, or mammon, or mars, or the muses become sovereign. If societies are disrupted by the destruction of their religious core, or if a new attempt to reconstruct a religious core does not provide for the constraint, challenging and channeling of these powers, we can expect the rise of sexual, economic, military, and cultural disarray. Moreover, we can expect fundamentalist and sectarian reactions to the fact that the operating norms and values of the necessary institutions of ordinary life are increasingly cluttered with the chaos of moral confusion.<sup>15</sup> They may not have solutions to the problems, but they may see the problems before the primary custodians of the moral fiber of civilization do.

One of the key realities of globalization is that this is happening now, and it is happening essentially under the influence of another set of powers that have developed a quite different set of institutional forms that are, in substantial measure, instigators and carriers of globalization. The powers that are behind these spheres of life may also be rather universal in human experience, but unlike the “Principalities”, however, these have only sometimes developed distinct and highly influential institutional matrices to advance them. These are more clearly “modern” historical creations, not naturally or necessarily present in all viable societies. Primary

among them are the “modern” professions – education, law, medicine, and engineering, especially bio-engineering, geo-engineering and socio-engineering – this third one is commonly called “management.” We may call these the “Authorities” of modern life, for these practices and behaviors have created spheres of life that are now populated by experts to whom everyone turns in times of difficulty. They not only claim to understand and help manage our erotic worlds, but our worlds of mammon, mars and the muses when they seem disordered, but they also claim to possess and know how to guide the “good” powers: scientia, jus, salus, and techné.

It is more than interesting that every culture has its own traditions for teaching and learning, procedures for adjudication of disputes or criminal behavior, for dealing with birthing and healing, and developing techniques for the principal activities of life. The teacher, initiator, guru, or “master” is known in every society; so is the “judge” or “council, the mid-wife and medicine-man, the craftsman and the experimenter; but only some cultures have developed elaborate institutional forms for cultivating and extending the influence of these Authorities. In fact, only in the West, specifically traceable to the ways in which the church interacted with, and often against, royal authorities, do we find the development of what is now commonly accepted around the world – the school and the university independent of the crown, constitutions and courts above the rulers, hospitals and clinics as non-governmental organizations, research institutes and management training centers separate from the regimes of the world, and professional associations differentiated from the nation-state. Historically, we can show that each of these areas was cultivated by the church in a long and deep history as a part of a deep Christian sense of vocation to serve God and the people. Indeed, when missionaries went to other cultures, they not only sought to convert persons and establish churches, but they introduced modern schools, constitutional law with human rights, modern medicine and new technologies and modes of management. Now, each of these areas of activity and institutional order has networks of professional associations that reach around the world.<sup>16</sup>

However, in their modern form, these areas of thought and activity have largely divorced themselves from any overt theological, and sometimes from any overt ethical content. Science and the modern research university have left religion largely behind, even if many scientists and professors are religious and certain religious traditions are the womb out of which science and the university were born. Medical training and contemporary hospitals have a place for chaplains, more or less, and many medical personnel may be religious, but the role of theology in the functional side of medical training, psychiatric treatments and health-care delivery systems is marginalized – even at the local Mount Sinai, St.

Mary's, or Presbyterian hospital. And the very idea that God's law, or any divinely ordered natural law, or a universal moral law written into the hearts of all, and the notion that lawyers are above all "called" to actualize the "holy righteousness" of "justice" would be ridiculed in the first year of law school. And so on one could go with the various forms of engineering; those on the cutting edge of technology seldom, if ever, see themselves obeying the divine command to have "dominion" over the earth, to repair (so far as possible) the disruptions in creation brought by "the fall," and to use the gifts of "the mechanical arts" closer to the vision of the New Jerusalem.

It is not that these spheres of professional life are entirely immoral, it is that they represent fragmented and fragmenting understandings of reality that, when exported to other societies around the world both attract for their competency and repel due to their spiritual emptiness. In each of these areas, to be sure, new courses in professional ethics are being developed or already being taught; but they seldom touch the moral and spiritual depths necessary for guiding the modern professional. Besides, as the authorities of science, law, medicine, and technology are exported around the world, the theories they advance appear to others as utterly devoid of morality, yet they disrupt the religious convictions and the ethos formed by indigenous religious traditions and undercut spiritual and ethical bases of cultural life. The responses of fundamentalism, re-tribalization and moral sectarianism, or the use of the marvelous technical resources of these authorities to exploit the environment and the people are quite understandable. Any one of these authorities, can bring death to a society, as we saw in the holocausts and gulags of the last century. And now, in our new global situation, it is a serious question whether they can help form a new civilization – the need of our time.

Both the ancient, perennial "Principalities" and the historic, cultivated "Authorities" are "Powers" that were rooted in theological developments that can be identified with the common grace of creation and with the historic grace of providence; but few "experts" in these areas see no need for the special grace of salvation other than what they think they, themselves, can supply. The leaders of the modern Authorities particularly have gradually shed any sense of a need for that, and have become highly ambiguous in their relationship to anything theological and thus about any divinely rooted sense of calling to serve humanity. They have the traces of these roots deep within them, although they celebrate their autonomy and seek to supply their own foundations – a project that Nietzsche saw through and that is now generally challenged by post-

modern critiques. It is not that these authorities never serve humanity, but the systematic exclusion of normative considerations in these fields blocks out any consciousness of their own roots, guiding principles or ultimate ends, and that means that they can easily become distorted, with no inner spiritual gyroscope and no deep moral rudder to guide what they do. The increased world-wide access to education brought by the missionary movement and institutionalized in modernity at the hands of the state is one of its greatest triumphs of the last several centuries; but the sense of "the dying of the light"<sup>17</sup> among theological and ethical critics of today's institutions of higher learning may not yet have produced the right answers in every respect, but they signal a declining confidence in the fact that a purely secular mode of learning is good for the increase of wisdom. The legal development of constitutional law with guarantees of human rights has brought the forms of modern political order to increasing numbers of lands around the globe, and where these become deeply rooted, the host cultures tend to flourish. But they do not become deeply rooted if their basic presuppositions are not overtly stated and believed; they become manipulated voting charades to mask and perpetuate tyranny. So also with engineering; technological transfer can help economic development and reduce drudgery; but if the metaphysical assumptions behind modern technology, which are religious in nature, are not acknowledged, and at least selectively embraced, the apparatus that technological transfer brings will be left to rust in the dust. Or, if they are adopted as entirely morally neutral techniques, they can be used to build weapons of mass destruction, to clone humanoids, to build grandiose palaces or cathedrals temples or monuments to the glory of local warlords.

It is doubtful that anything can provide the inner moral and spiritual fiber to these spheres than a theologically grounded ethic. Only a way of thinking and believing that acknowledges a moral and spiritual reality beyond what humans construct out of their interests and imagination can restrain the arrogant egoism of the elites and encourage the weak and the victims to seek a better truth and justice than what they offer. Indeed, the only power that has a chance of shaping, constraining, challenging, and channeling these powers is religion, feeble as it appears to be from the outside. But if we turn to this issue, we must consider the third, and indeed the most important, set of "Powers" that are in globalization. If religion is a critical factor in understanding whence globalization came, and guiding its directions to that it becomes a blessing and not a curse to humanity, what shall our theology entail, and what shall we think of the world religions? How can we expect them to interact, and, even more, how shall we treat them? The many dimensions of this

question are now under heated debate about pluralism and the new sub-discipline of Theology of Religions.<sup>18</sup>

Our question is this: since we can easily encounter a pluralism of religions in a globalizing world, and we can choose among them, what kind of religion shall we choose? Or, to put it another way for our issues, what kind of religious orientation can provide the inner spiritual and moral architecture for an immensely complex civilization, yet, while setting the basic convictional skeleton of the new global civil society so that it is both as meaning-full and as just as human societies can be, can also keep the society sufficiently open that any who are not persuaded may find a place of freedom and tolerance while they confess, practice, and advocate some other religion or ultimate world-view.

At this point we must introduce the concept of the "Dominions," a word taken from the Latin for "Lord" – *dominus*. It makes a great deal of difference whether the center(s) of human loyalty is. For that will shape the socio-cultural decisions as to whom the regnant lord (or lords) of the globalization process and the possible new civilization to which the people around the world turn to guide their responses to globalization are. This will determine what it is that guides the formation of the emerging material basis of an interdependent economy, the new global civil society that supercedes the nation-states of the world, and overarching features of the increasingly common culture. Shall we turn to the Spirits of the Elders and of Nature as we find them dominating every decision in life among most traditional tribal peoples? Or shall we turn to the wisdom of Master Kung as we find it in the classic Confucian empires of East Asia; or the spirituality of Lord Krishna or Lord Shiva as we find them portrayed in the great moral epics of the Indian sub-continent; or the stark enlightened insights of Lord Buddha as he is honored in the temples of South-East Asia, or the great warrior-Prophet Mohammed as followed in the Arabic world; or Christ.<sup>19</sup> Or is it the case that a quasi-religious Enlightenment-driven view of humanity and progress (neo-Liberal, evolutionary or revolutionary) can guide the future?

All these religiously formed civilizations, in varying degrees and with varying degrees of effectiveness, have formed institutional networks that order and guide the Principalities, and many have developed sophisticated ways of dealing with what we here call the Authorities, at least in their early forms. But sooner or later, we have to ask what kinds of civilizations they lead to (in principle and in fact) and what kinds of justice, cultural and intellectual vitality, economic prosperity and spiritual integrity they foster. Yet to pose these questions can be explosive, and much study of religions is "non-theological" and "non-evaluative." Indeed,

the academic approach to religion is often much like popular opinion in this: many want the religions to be viewed as if they are all of equal worth and a matter of personal background or choice, or of accidental cultural development. The American experience, in which we try very hard not to discriminate against persons whether they are Baptist or Catholic, Presbyterian or Pentecostal, Muslim or Marxist, does not equip us to see what is at stake in our global setting. This wonderfully tolerant perspective with regard to the faith of individual persons, which should be spread across the globe, nevertheless hides the fact that each of the great world religions in fact judges the kinds of persons the other religions tend to produce and, even more, how the various religions structure marriage, politics, culture, economics, and professional life – in short, how they form civilizations. The question that this raises is whether we can identify any more valid or less valid forms of religious belief and practice specifically both as they reflect the true divine reality and as they shape persons and the Powers of the common life. People do make such judgments, but the decisive question is whether we can evaluate the "Lords" fairly and wisely, at least in terms of their ability to shape a viable global civilization?

Tribal peoples have formed societies under the influence of traditional religions that could integrate patterns of family, economic, political, and cultural life in specific niches. These religions and patterns of life never completely disappear, but in the long story of globalization, they have been increasingly absorbed into cultures formed by the so-called "high" religions – Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and, of course, Christianity. In fact Hindu missionaries are today actively working among the tribal peoples of India, Islam is expanding among tribal peoples in equatorial Africa, and Christianity continues to grow in southern Africa, Latin America, in south and south-east Asia. These larger, more complex religions have in turn formed highly complex and differentiated societies, with refined systems of education, law, medicine and technology for, at least, elite males; but nearly always they have formed command-societies that are ruled from the top down. They have, to be sure, done this in different ways: Confucian-influenced societies since the Han dynasty substantially unified the tribes of China, almost always find their center in the Emperor, with educated elites serving both as bureaucratic administrators and as priestly advisors under and for him, and their subordinates working among the people. At the lower levels the father of each extended family serves as the little emperor over his household. All are to work to order the whole of society into a single, integrated unit that is in harmony with heaven and earth. All outsiders – including remaining ethnic minorities in their little niches, Tribal Muslim in the northwest or Tibetan Buddhists in the southwest, plus today the Falun Gong and

Independent Christians – are expected to give it honor and pay it tribute, with a heavy price if they do not. That vision has been perpetuated under Chinese Communism, with the Chairman replacing the Emperor, in title, and the party ideologists replacing the Mandarin literati. We can get a glimpse of what a globalized world would look like, should this deep tradition become the model of the emerging world order, and today China is enthusiastically globalizing faster than any other developing country, cautiously confident that it can adapt modern forms of education, law, medicine and technology into a new solidarity with Chinese characteristics. Ironically, however, the desire for technology of computers with its new access to the internet, the formation of independent corporations as state-managed economic institutions falter, and the agreements to international law not controllable from the center, for instance when China joined the WTO, introduce profoundly different value systems that could be indigestible and modify the system; but many intellectuals see the adoption of these into the Chinese way of preparing China to become the world's next superpower, to which all will pay tribute.

The Hinduism of India presents a different possibility. It has not homogenized the tribal peoples and ethnic groups of India into a single people under the rule of an imperial series of dynasties, it has stacked them one on top of another in a very distinct hierarchy of communal identities, the famous “caste system.” It is quite proper to call this system hierarchical, for the root meaning of the term (heiros) has to do with the rule of the priests, and at the top of the Indian system are the Brahmins. In large measure, they and their subordinate allies, the warriors and governing classes of every province and region, control the educational, media, and ideological systems that guide cultural, legal, political and economic policies. The caste system is troubling to Christians (and Marxists) in India, and generated new forms of radical grass-roots action among the Dalits – those groups who used to be called “outcastes” or “harijans.” These groups have adopted ideas of normative human equality from Christianity and from the Enlightenment, and while India has become the world's largest democracy in the sense that all qualified adults can vote and a free press is vibrant, the view that society should not be hierarchical simply does not register. New Dalit-governed institutions, including large sections of the Christian church, remain decidedly hierarchical. Of course, say leading Hindu advocates, every civilization is governed by dominant spiritual ideals, and any empirical look at humanity will reveal that every society is constituted by ethnic and culturally defined relative approximations to those ideals, and the classic Hindu recognition of natural hierarchy is the way things really ultimately are. To deny this is to deny reality. This is one of the great, enduring world-models of how to

organize a complex civilization, and India is the second most rapidly globalizing land on earth, dominated by an amazingly rich and complex religious heritage.

This heritage was, in considerable substance, repudiated by Buddhism, which nevertheless preserved many of the devotional practices and social attitudes that stood at the margins of Hindu thought. Especially important are two developments – the radical focus on the state of spiritual consciousness in the individual person, rather than in the social status and duties given by birth and social rank; and the acceptance of the leadership of royalty in all external matters. Buddhism, thus, tends toward a “two-agent” theory of reality – the self must deal with the inner world, detaching the mind and heart from those worldly desires and attachments that bring suffering; and the king must deal with the outer world, prudently providing an ordered environment where laity and non-believers can form their families, grow their crops, do their business, and cultivate their inner detachment from the material distractions of the earth. This tradition has, thus, been attracted to and attractive of kingly support, and rulers often see the monasteries and temples, which they build, as providing a haven for spiritual growth among the spiritually sensitive, and an opportunity for any who make offerings to them to share in their merit. This model has been most profoundly developed, in different ways, in Sri Lanka, Indochina, Tibet, and parts of China and Japan; but its social forms are under threat everywhere and it has not produced dynamic cultural or economic developments that clearly can contribute to a global future. It inevitably adapts to the authority structure of its host culture. However, Buddhism as a personal spiritual discipline and quest has contributed enormously to many persons, and, heavily to post-Jewish and post-Christian intellectuals in the West, including many who hold “new age” perspectives and basically trust a secular, liberal democracy to solve social problems, for it provides a richer spiritual psychology than that developed by much of modern Western psychology, which it holds to be the decisive religious issue.

As critically as we may look at these options, here all-to-briefly sketched, we have to admit that the social visions most systematically identified with Master Kung, Lord Krishna, and Lord Buddha are not entirely alien to parts, pieces, and periods of Christian history. Those deep, now obscure battles between popes and emperors, bishops and kings, monk and patriarch in our Western social history parallels these alternatives in substantial measure. The ideal of the Constantinian empire approximated the Chinese model of a ruling empire, with priests as its chaplains and agents, a model not far from those worked out in some of the Eastern Orthodox Christian traditions, as well as that of the Anglican

establishment after Henry VIII. At other times, rulers deferred to the authority of the curia, while the bishops' estates, social prestige and artistic patronage were large, and populist, crusading armies marched at the command of religious leaders – not far removed from the Hindutva movements in India. And, in a general sort of way, the Buddhist division between inner spirituality and external deferment to political authority parallels some developments that have taken place in Christian Evangelical thought, from Luther to contemporary neo-Evangelicalism. None of these are likely to fade soon; but it is also doubtful that they can offer a compelling and just vision for our global future.

Of course, Islam is the other great non-Christian tradition, and it does have a profound vision of the world, and it has a sense of its God-given duty to bring the whole world under its rule. While millions of believers have found a way to understand God and the purposes of life through this great tradition, our task here is to identify, so far as we are able, its possible contribution to the ordering of a global future. As I understand it, Islam can be said to be essentially theocratic in social-political conception; heavily legalistic in its understanding of how to order the practice of the religion, the conduct of personal life, and the ordering of the common life, and, although I must say this with due caution, primarily fundamentalistic in its view of the authority of its holy scripture. In this regard, it is similar to certain developments in the Judaism of the ancient world, and to Protestant fundamentalism as it developed especially in the last century or so in America. We are today in the process of trying to understand whether these features of Islam are intrinsic to it, or whether they are contemporary eruptions in Islam, as their parallels have been in both Judaism and Christianity. And while it is wrong for any regime to declare war on any religion, as all of the religions here mentioned had done at one time or another, it is unlikely that the present powers of the world will allow this vision to come to dominate the global future.

Christians, of course, think that the true Lord has been revealed in time and life, as well as in the very structure and dynamics of creation and the moral law written on the hearts of each person, and that in Jesus Christ we can see what the character of a true and just lordship that establishes dominion, but not domination, really is. This draws us into disciplined patterns of service and purpose that are able to transform our hearts, minds, and relationships, and to alter the regencies of the world – of patriarchal elders, of emperors, of priestly hierarchies, of royalty, and of theocrats. The issue is whether Christ's Lordship can today reframe the Powers, strengthening the Principalities under new conditions, and compellingly call the Authorities to rediscover and revitalize their spiritual and

moral roots so that they may enhance a common domain of disciplined service to God and humanity. And can this Lord also reshape the other Dominions too? Can He help them find ideas of new possibilities in their own traditions and lift them into new levels of relationship, mutuality, and ethical coherence? We do not know for certain, but we can glimpse parts of the vision that we can pray will come to prominence.

Two great models of what Christianity offers on this front have been developed, and a third is acknowledged as helpful in certain respects. The idea of covenant is among the central concepts of the biblical tradition, and was long understood in biblical times to be the paradigmatic, providential way of structuring the institutions of the common life in accord with God's law and purposes while simultaneously pointing all spheres of society toward redemptive possibilities. That connection needs to be recovered and recast for our contemporary situation.<sup>20</sup>

There are, of course, different forms of covenant, implied already in the different terms in the Hebrew *bnai berit* and *baalei berit*, for example, and in the ways they are translated and adapted into other cultural-linguistic contexts: *diatheke* and sometimes *syntheke* or even *mysterion* (Greek), *testamentum*, *compactum*, *sacramentum*, or *foedus* (Latin), in the New Testament and early Christian writings, and later in social, political, and legal thought as pact, compact, federation, confederation, *Bund* (German; "bond" or "bounden duty" in old English), *alliance* (French), and thus holy league, agreement, or mutual promise, to name the most frequent usages in western languages. I list all these meanings so that we can note the frequency and social overtones of these terms and see how pervasive and thick with implications the idea can be. All these terms refer to a God-given capacity to voluntarily "bond" persons, peoples, or institutions into communities of commitment that otherwise would remain in isolation or conflict. Covenant forms a matrix of interacting consociations that makes peace, justice, mutual obligation and care more probable, because all persons and parts of the complex, diversified social system see themselves under a divinely given and grace-full higher moral law and called to a more ultimate purpose in life, one that serves God's purposes for humanity beyond mere survival or success. This is the basic pattern behind the great ecumenical councils and synods of Christian history. Indeed, in every genuine covenant, six elements are present: The Divine is disclosed in the midst of history. Mutual promises are made. A new community of confederated communities is formed. Duties and rights are accepted. Freedom and justice are made constitutional. And a vision of a new, holy future for civilization is opened to and for all.

Covenant has sometimes been interpreted in tribalistic or nation-

alistic ways. But under Christ's dominion, it not only surpasses those, but contrasts with two other models that have become decisive in many cultures. One is the hierarchical-subsidiary model that has become central to the Catholic tradition, with its parallels, as mentioned, to aspects of the Confucian and Hindu models. And the other is the individualistic-contractual one, which was part of the old structure of Roman law, developed further by the Enlightenment social philosophies, and was largely accepted by the French Revolution's view of the social contract in one form and by the Industrial Revolution's view of commercial contracts in another. Both have elements that potentially overlap with the covenant idea, and in some aspects of life each of these two has a distinct role. Each can become a form of grace.

In my view, we need to have a rebirth of the confederation model of covenant, one that recognizes the relative role of hierarchical leadership and subsidiarity and of temporal contracts in particular contexts. I emphasize this matter today, for it appears that the United States, rooted in the covenant idea as it generated our constitutional democracy, may now be assuming the role of an imperial power, and celebrating, or even imposing, the commercial contractual model on all human relationships. But if the United States does presume to become the policeman of the world, it had better know what model it is adopting and why, how it is going to relate to the other models, and whether it wants to bring creative forms of grace or impose arbitrary will. The forms of state power and individualistic self-celebration that are so prominent today, are unlikely to suffice either in forming alliances to discern and enforce just principles or in providing a graceful vision for the shape of a post-war world, should that become an eventuality.

If the global trends continue, and are modified and adopted, even if begrudging by the peoples of the world, we can say that not only would the confederated covenantal model of the common life find a new arena of incarnation that has implications for the emerging global civil society, but that globalization, understood in its more complex meanings, could be "for good" -- both lasting and for human well-being. It could promote a highly pluralistic global civilization with increased prospect for peace with justice. In the final analysis, however, it is unlikely to happen unless it finds its focus in Christ as Lord, for Christ is the one who has, and can ever and again, renew the covenant between God and humanity, and point souls toward reconciliation with God and neighbor, and societies toward a New Jerusalem. This, in my view, does not mean that everyone in the world must become Christian; but it does mean that both non-Christian and many Christian traditions may have to be modified in this direction on this point -- just as many have adopted the principles of Human

Rights, which historically derive from nowhere else than from certain streams of the Christian heritage. Of course, such a modification cannot be forced, it has to be adopted on its moral and spiritual, as well as its practical merits. Yet we might want to acknowledge that for some, such a modification would mean something like a modest conversion of the traditions. This would, or could, become a means of grace to and for the world in a structural sense.

One other motif needs to be mentioned as I draw to a conclusion -- a motif that needs further development and joint study. This is the notion that under such a confederated-covenantal system, individual persons, especially those in the bureaucratized modern authorities, the proliferating professions of the global world, have to be prepared to see their moral and spiritual way through the complexities of these new areas of life, and to integrate them, better than is often done at this time, into patterns of ordinary family, cultural, and daily economic existence. In brief, both the Principalities and the Authorities of modern life have to be drawn again into a deeper sense of vocation than now appears to be the case.

This, I propose, is one of the great responsibilities of the church and parallel religious communities in our time. We need public theological educational programs at all levels, from religiously informed ethics courses in the professional schools to rituals of commissioning that invite school teachers, pharmacists, law clerks, and lab technicians as well as scientists and professors, doctors and nurses, lawyers and judges, engineers and researchers form both the internal value system around a valid and vibrant religious conviction, and a sense of calling in regard to what they do. This can and should cohere with other obligations that one has in life -- family, responsible use of financial resources, being a responsible citizen and supporting cultural creativity, for instance. Some of this has begun, but it is still feeble and fractured. To mount such a project, a new ecumenical interaction of Protestant notions of vocation and covenant with Orthodox and Roman Catholic sensibilities about sacrament and rite and, even more, with classic understandings of formation and genuine catholicity will have to be cultivated. Of course, this would mean calling upon an insecure clergy to renew itself, and to take on questions and issues that have, in recent centuries, often been far from their training or self-understanding. Still, it remains a growing conviction of mine, fueled by intellectual struggle with the issues posed by globalization, that this must be done for the well-being of the peoples of the earth. These too would, or could, be forms of grace for our day.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> This paper is in part developed out the research project, God and Globalization, 4 vol., 3 now published (Harrisburg: Trinity, 2000, 2001, 2002) and investigations and dialogues in India, Japan, China, and Europe. See "Public Theology and Civil Society in a Globalizing Era," The Bangalore Theological Forum, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 [India] (June, 2000), pp. 46-72, and related essays in The Bulletin of Seigakuin University Research Institute [Japan] (forthcoming, March, 2003). Some of these motifs also appear (in Chinese) in a book co-authored with Bao Limin A Dialogical Approach to the Value of Modernity (Shanghai, PRC: Scholars Press, 2001), and in "The Moral Roots of the Common Life in a Global Era," Expository Times [Edinburgh] (113/5, Feb. 2002), pp. 157-161.
- <sup>2</sup> Lee Cormie, of St. Michaels College, Toronto, offered an account of anti-globalization protests in his "Ethics of Globalization," delivered at the Society of Christian Ethics Annual Meeting, Jan. 2003. An analysis that exemplifies the widespread sentiment against globalization in these terms can be found in the report of the Asian Social Forum mass demonstration. See "Globalizing Resistance," Frontline [India] (Jan. 31, 2003).
- <sup>3</sup> That is a main point in my Capitalism, Civil Society, Religion and the Poor (Wilmington, DE: ISI, 2002, written with Lawrence M. Stratton. Cf. also, Peter J. Dougherty, Who's Afraid of Adam Smith? (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002). The best historical overview of the evidence is found in David Landes' massive An Inquiry into the Wealth and Poverty of Nations (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).
- <sup>4</sup> Peter Berger anticipated these developments in his The Capitalist Revolution (New York: 1985), and later studies seem to confirm it. See my Capitalism, Civil Society, Religion and the Poor: A Bibliographical Essay, with Larry Stratton (Wilmington: ISI Press, 2002).
- <sup>5</sup> See his essay in God and Globalization, vol. 1, op.cit., Ch. 1.
- <sup>6</sup> This is the view seriously challenged by Lawrence Harrison, et al., rich collection of essays on current research, Culture Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
- <sup>7</sup> See his "Introduction," Many Globalizations (N.Y.: Oxford, 2002), which he edited with S. Huntington (New York: Oxford U. Press, 2002).
- <sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 2000); and Robin Wright: Sacred Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
- <sup>9</sup> Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order (New York: Touchstone Books, 1998).
- <sup>10</sup> See, e.g., D. F. Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (New York: Knopf, 1998).
- <sup>11</sup> Quoted from the Proceedings by O.G. Myklebust, The Study of Missions in Theological Education, 2 Vol. (Oslo: Egede Instituttet, 1955, 1957), p. 2.

- <sup>12</sup> It is fascinating how much the Fascists and the Communists were, and no few post-modernists are, influenced by J.-J. Rousseau's vision of the "noble savage," Henry Morgan's mythic anthropology which claimed to discover the true nature of human relationships in "primitive" tribal communitarianism, and the romantic anti-"modern" societal communalism of Ferdinand Tönnies – whether they have read these sources or not.
- <sup>13</sup> Two significant works that suggest these directions are James Skillen and J. McCartney, eds., Political Order and the Plural Structure of Society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishers, 1991), and Michael Cromartie, ed., A Preserving Grace: Protestants, Catholics and Natural Law (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publisher, 1997).
- <sup>14</sup> The term is Walter Rauschenbush's, A Theology for the Social Gospel (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1918), Chapt. 1.
- <sup>15</sup> This is the topic of God and Globalization, vol. 1, subtitled: Religion and the Powers of the Common Life, op. cit. It contains outstanding articles by not only Roland Robertson, but Yersu Kim of UNESCO, and US scholars William Schweiker, Donald Shriver, Mary Stuart Van Leeuwen and David Tracy.
- <sup>16</sup> These are the core issues of God and Globalization, vol. 2, subtitled: The Spirit and the Authorities of Modernity, op.cit., with contributions on these topics by Richard Osmer, John Witte, Jr., Allen Verhey, and Ronald Cole-Turner. I do not take up, in this presentation, other matters discussed in that volume: the formation of still a third set of authorities, which I call "regencies" (a translation of the New Testament thronos), which include the worle-wide ecological movement, the cross-cultural recognition of virtue, as in the Nobel Peace Prize, and the growing influence of intergovernmental agencies from the UN and World Court, to the World Bank, IMF and WTO.
- <sup>17</sup> This is the title of James T. Burtchaell's challenge to Christian higher education (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishers, 1998). Cf. also Warren Nord, Religion and American Education (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina Press, 1995); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Educating for Life (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2002); and William F. May, Beleaguered Rulers: The Public Obligation of the Professional (Louisville: Westminster Press, 2001).
- <sup>18</sup> See Mark S. Heim, Salvations (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995); and Paul Knitter, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002).
- <sup>19</sup> This is the focus of God and Globalization, vol. 3: Christ and the Dominions of Civilization, op.cit., with major essays by Diane Obenchain, Scott Thomas, John Mbiti, Sze-kar Wan, Thomas Thangaraj, Kosuke Koyama and Lamin Sannah.
- <sup>20</sup> The virtual explosion of materials on covenant can be represented by Daniel Elazar's The Covenant Tradition in Politics, 4 vol. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995-1999) and Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (New York: Oxford U. Press, 2000), and their fine bibliographies.