



The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.

 Fact #1: For EMEs, foreign bank lending is the key component of cross-border capital flows



 Fact #1: For EMEs, foreign bank lending is the key component of cross-border capital flows



Syndicated credit: over 80% of loans are provided by foreign banks in EMEs vs. less than 50% for DMEs (see paper, Figure III)


# Fact #2: Much of the foreign banks' lending is in USD

		Cross-Border Loans (Source: DealScan)					Cross-Border "Bank Claims" (Source: BIS)					
Currency:	USD	EUR	GBP	JPY	Other	USI	) EUR	GBP	JPY	Other		
Region:												
EME: Africa	88.8%	5.3%	0.1%	0.8%	4.9%	65.5	5% 12.7%	3.9%	1.0%	16.9%		
EME: Americas	91.3%	1.1%	0.0%	0.7%	6.9%	75.6	6% 4.4%	0.2%	1.7%	18.2%		
EME: Asia	69.7%	1.3%	0.7%	4.2%	24.0%	51.9	5.0%	0.3%	1.3%	41.5%		
EME: Europe	56.0%	30.9%	0.0%	0.6%	12.5%	31.9	38.8%	0.5%	1.1%	27.7%		
DME	69.8%	19.7%	5.0%	0.7%	4.8%	43.3	36.9%	4.9%	4.9%	10.1%		

- → Across all industries: see paper Table I (detailed country data) and Table II
- → Stable over time: see paper Figure IV

Currency breakdown of syndicated cross-border loans to EME borrowers based on outstanding claims. All claims include also bond and equity holdings. Claims at 2016:Q3. Source: DealScan, BIS, Authors' calculations.

### Focus: Cross-border Loans to EMEs and U.S. Monetary Policy



• Figure shows relationship between cross-border loans to emerging market economies (EMEs) and U.S. monetary policy. Annual data from 1980 through 2015. Source: IMF, Authors' calculations.

### Identification of Channel with Loan-Level Data

Syndicated loan data: global issuance, 1990-2016 (119 EMEs)

With loan-level data (as opposed to aggregate macro data) we know:

- the identity of the bank (lender) and firm (borrower)
- the loan conditions (volume, maturity, etc.)
- the <u>currency</u> of the loan

Allows us to better identify the effect of U.S. monetary policy on dollar loan supply by global banks to EME borrowers (credit channel + risk-taking channel)

#### **Related Literature**

#### Macro evidence

- Rey (2013)
- Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015)
- McCaulay, McGuire and Sushko (2015)
- Takas and Temesvary (2016)

#### Fund evidence

- Forbes and Warnock (2012)
- Fratzscher (2012)
- Ahmed and Zlate (2013)

#### Bank evidence

- Baskaya et al. (2017) Turkey
- Altunok et al. (2017) Turkey
- Peydro and Ruiz (2015) Mexico
- Demirguc-Kunt, Horvath and Huzinga (2017) – Syndicated data

Table III: Baseline results (unit of observation: Loan x Lender)

	(1)	(2)	(4)
U.S. Interest Rate	-0.144***		
	(-11.49)		
U.S. Interest Rate * DME		-0.090***	
		(-9.98)	
U.S. Interest Rate * EME		-0.194***	-0.081***
		(-9.66)	(-7.69)
U.S. Term Spread * EME			
U.S. Shadow Rate * EME			
EME		-0.951***	
		(13.43)	
Fixed Effects			
Borrower (D <sub>i</sub> )			Yes
Bank * Quarter (D <sub>jt</sub> )			Yes

Table III: Baseline results (unit of observation: Loan x Lender)

					Pre-ZLB Period	ZLB Period
	(1)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
U.S. Interest Rate	-0.144***					
	(-11.49)					
U.S. Interest Rate * DME		-0.090***				
		(-9.98)				
U.S. Interest Rate * EME		-0.194***	-0.081***	-0.164***	-0.074**	
		(-9.66)	(-7.69)	(-12.71)	(-3.41)	
U.S. Term Spread * EME				-0.158***	-0.092**	
				(-6.80)	(-3.08)	
U.S. Shadow Rate * EME						-0.068**
						(-2.75)
EME		-0.951***				
		(13.43)				
Fixed Effects						
Borrower (D <sub>i</sub> )			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank * Quarter (D <sub>jt</sub> )			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Holds across all geographical regions and industries Quantitatively, similar result if using aggregate BIS data

Table III: Baseline results (unit of observation: Loan x Lender)

Banks' Loan Exposure to U.S.:	< 10%	< 5%	< 5%	< 5%	< 5%	< 5%
Borrowers:			Non- Tradable Industry	Sectors with Low Export Share	Country with Low Trade Overall	Country with Low Trade with U.S.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
U.S. Interest Rate * EME	-0.159***	-0.078*	-0.091**	-0.181***	-0.092**	-0.348***
	(-5.58)	(-1.79)	(-1.99)	(-2.69)	(-2.09)	(-5.71)
U.S. Term Spread * EME	-0.186***	-0.112*	-0.135**	-0.073	-0.092	-0.517***
	(-4.29)	(-1.76)	(-2.02)	(-0.26)	(-1.51)	(-5.97)
Fixed Effects:						
Borrower (D <sub>i</sub> )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank * Quarter (D <sub>it</sub> )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Results are unlikely to be driven by correlated demand with U.S. monetary policy.

Table IV: EME dummy replaced by country characteristics

	"High-Yield Market" Defined Using:										
	GDP Growth	GDP Growth	Interest Rate Spread	Interest Rate Spread	Equity Returns	Equity Returns	Country Rating	Country Rating			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			
U.S. Interest Rate * High-Yield Market	-0.002**	-0.006***	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.024*	-0.031	-0.007***	-0.014***			
	(-2.05)	(-3.00)	(-5.65)	(-3.65)	(-1.68)	(-0.80)	(-6.45)	(-7.92)			
U.S. Term Spread * High-Yield Market		-0.007*		-0.001		-0.013		-0.012***			
		(-1.97)		(-0.92)		(-0.20)		(-4.49)			
High-Yield Market	0.014***	0.036***	0.014***	0.019***	0.025	0.065	-0.063***	-0.010			
	(2.71)	(3.08)	(5.36)	(2.91)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(-5.23)	(-0.69)			
Fixed Effects:											
Borrower (D <sub>i</sub> )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Bank * Quarter (D <sub>it</sub> )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			

Financial openness (conditional on country rating) magnifies the impact (Table VII)

Table V: Specialness of U.S. monetary policy

Loan Currency:	USD	USD	USD	USD	EUR
			Non-U.S. Banks,		U.S. Banks,
			Non-U.S. B	Borrowers	Non-EU Borrowers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Euro Interest Rate * EME	-0.147***	-0.018	-0.034		-0.228**
	(-7.82)	(-0.57)	(-0.86)		(-2.37)
Euro Term Spread * EME	-0.036	0.030	0.046		-0.136
	(-1.25)	(1.10)	(1.17)		(-0.71)
U.S. Interest Rate * EME		-0.191***	-0.187***	-0.196***	-0.029
		(-5.64)	(-4.00)	(-4.05)	(-0.21)
U.S. Term Spread * EME		-0.223***	-0.263***	-0.343***	-0.136
		(-5.34)	(-4.42)	(-4.21)	(-0.71)
Fixed Effects:					
Borrower (D <sub>i</sub> )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank * Quarter (D <sub>it</sub> )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113,277	113,277	51,091	16,809	210
R-squared	0.825	0.826	0.843	0.887	0.940

# **Borrower-Level Impact**

Table VIII: Substitution between local and foreign lenders at firm level

Dependent Variable:		(I	Interest Rate Spread (bps)					
	Firm-Qu		oreign and D ders	omestic				
		Foreign Banks	Local Banks	All Banks				
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
U.S. Interest Rate * EME		-0.075***	-0.085***	-0.079***	-0.024***	-0.036***	3.855***	9.402***
		(-4.51)	(-6.61)	(-5.54)	(-2.65)	(-3.10)	(2.72)	(4.61)
U.S. Term Spread * EME						-0.023		10.007***
						(-1.20)		(2.82)
Fixed Effects:								
Borrower (D <sub>i</sub> )		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter (D <sub>t</sub> )		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		24,754	24,754	24,754	40,134	40,134	30,829	30,829

## Foreign Bank Reliance of EME Firms

Table IX (Sample: EME firms only)

Dependent Variable:	(Log) Bo Amount				ate Spread ps)			ibility of ancing
	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)
Past Foreign Bank Reliance	0.155**	0.200		<b>-</b> 6.111	-75.645***		0.044	0.232***
	(2.10)	(1.11)		(-0.62)	(-3.57)		(1.02)	(2.74)
Past Foreign Bank Reliance * U.S. Interest Rate	-0.035*	-0.042		2.867	14.430***		-0.023**	-0.057***
	(-1.67)	(-1.19)		(1.18)	(3.78)		(-2.37)	(-3.29)
Past Foreign Bank Reliance * U.S. Term Spread		-0.017			25.392***			-0.067**
		(-0.27)			(3.42)			(-2.52)
Fixed Effects:								
Borrower (D <sub>i</sub> )	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Quarter (D <sub>t</sub> )	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes

Reliance is fraction of the last loan funded by foreign banks

1 SD (0.32) → \$28 million drop for 25 bps increase in rate

1 SD → 1.2 bps drop for 25 bps increase in rate(vs. 16.3% mean) 1 SD → 0.2 bps drop for 25 bps increase in rate(vs. 16.3% mean)

#### **Conclusions**

- We provide new insights into the transmission of U.S. monetary policy to emerging markets credit cycle
  - Channel operates through dominance of U.S. dollar lending of global banks across all EME regions and industries
- A typical U.S. monetary easing cycle, EME borrowers experience a 32-percentage-point greater increase in the volume of loans issued by foreign banks than do borrowers from developed markets, with a similarly large effect upon reversal of the U.S. monetary policy stance